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“UNDETECTED, UNSUSPECTED, AND
UNKNOWN”: SHOULD WE ANTICIPATE
PROBLEMS FOR SCIENTIFIC INNOVATION
FOLLOWING SCHERING CORP. V. GENEVA
PHARMACEUTICALS?
Jeffrey Coleman*
Once termed the “metaphysics” of patent law, the doctrine of inherent
anticipation has befuddled courts and practitioners alike for decades.
Inherent anticipation refers to the notion that a previously published
reference can disclose each and every limitation of a later-patented
invention without expressly delineating those limitations.
These
(un)disclosed limitations are necessarily present, or inherent, within the
previously published reference. When a previously published reference
discloses a later-claimed invention expressly or inherently, the patent
covering the later-claimed invention is invalid because the invention lacks
novelty. Thus, the doctrine of inherent anticipation allows invalidation of a
patent in whole or in part upon a showing that a prior reference contained
a patentee’s later-disclosed invention, even if the earlier reference did not
expressly disclose what the patentee claimed as his invention.
Courts, including the Federal Circuit, have grappled with whether a
person having ordinary skill in the relevant art must recognize inherent
features in the prior art reference for the doctrine of inherent anticipation
to apply. The resulting intracircuit split in Federal Circuit case law
fostered two competing schools of thought on this issue. The Federal
Circuit eventually held that recognition of inherent features is not required.
Commentators, however, have called upon the court to revisit the doctrine
due to its potential chilling effects on innovation. This Note suggests that
the Federal Circuit should reexamine the doctrine, paying particular
attention to considerations of whether or not a person having ordinary skill
in the art was capable of identifying inherent features in the asserted prior
art reference. Clarification, or even outright reformation, of the inherent
anticipation doctrine grows more imperative as our technological
capabilities quickly outpace our legal rules.

* J.D. Candidate, 2014, Fordham University School of Law; Ph.D., 2010, Pennsylvania
State University; B.S., 2003, Ursinus College. I would like to thank Inna Burshteyn for her
love and unconditional support. I would also like to thank Professor John Richards for
teaching me patent law and for helpful discussions.
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INTRODUCTION
Humans lit fires for thousands of years before realizing that oxygen is
necessary to create and maintain a flame. The first person to discover the
necessity of oxygen certainly could not have obtained a valid patent claim
for “a method of making a fire by lighting a flame in the presence of
oxygen.” Even if prior art on lighting fires did not disclose the
importance of oxygen and one of ordinary skill in the art did not know
about the importance of oxygen, understanding this law of nature would
not give the discoverer a right to exclude others from practicing the prior
art of making fires.1

The doctrine of inherent anticipation has been described as “a puzzle that
runs throughout patent law,”2 a “troublesome area of U.S. patent law,”3 and

1. EMI Grp. N. Am., Inc. v. Cypress Semiconductor Corp., 268 F.3d 1342, 1351 (Fed.
Cir. 2001).
2. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Inherency, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 371, 372
(2005).
3. Janice M. Mueller & Donald S. Chisum, Enabling Patent Law’s Inherent
Anticipation Doctrine, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 1101, 1102 (2008).
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a “doctrinal morass.”4 The cases forming the underlying basis for the
doctrine of inherent anticipation are confusing, at best, and the resulting
opinions invoking the doctrine are confused, at worst.5
At its core, the doctrine of inherent anticipation functions to preclude
patent protection for new inventions when a previously published reference
discloses “each and every limitation”6 of the invention sought to be
patented.7 U.S. patent laws prescribe that only new inventions may be
patented.8 Obviously, an invention is not new (i.e., novel) when it already
exists, and is therefore ineligible for patent protection.9 Similarly, an
invention is not patentable if it has been expressly described in the prior art
(such as in previously filed specifications in patent applications, journal
articles, or other printed publications).10 However, “[t]echnologies may
have qualities that are unappreciated or unidentified in a patent description,
but which are nonetheless present. The law refers to these unknown
attributes as ‘inherent’ in the product or process.”11 The doctrine of
inherency allows for invalidation of a patent, in whole or in part, when a
prior art reference does not expressly disclose each and every limitation of
the claimed invention.12 A patent is not novel (or patentable) for inherency
when a single prior art reference inherently describes a missing feature of
the claimed invention, so long as the missing feature is a deliberate or a
4. Id. at 1103.
5. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 2, at 373 (“The cases appear to flatly contradict each
other, are often accompanied by dissents, and in the last three years alone have triggered one
abortive en banc rehearing and strong calls for a second.” (citation omitted)).
6. See McClain v. Ortmayer, 141 U.S. 419, 424 (1891) (“[T]he object of the patent law
in requiring the patentee to particularly point out and distinctly claim the part, improvement,
or combination which he claims as his invention or discovery, is not only to secure to him all
to which he is entitled, but to apprise the public of what is still open to them.” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
7. Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 339 F.3d 1373, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2003), reh’g
denied, 348 F.3d 992 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (en banc).
8. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006). Further conditions for patentability are outlined in Title
35 of the U.S. Code. Briefly, an invention is eligible for patent protection when it is new,
useful, nonobvious, and directed at statutorily acceptable subject matter. See id. §§ 101–03.
The first paragraph of section 112 further demands that patent applicants set forth a written
description sufficient to prove that they possessed the claimed invention at the time of the
application filing, this description must be enough to enable one skilled in the art to make
and use the invention. See id. § 112, para. 1; see also Ariad Pharms. Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co.,
598 F.3d 1336, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc) (holding that the first paragraph of § 112
contains a written description requirement separate from enablement). Finally, the patent
application must conclude with claims particularly delineating the bounds of the invention.
See 35 U.S.C. § 112, para. 2.
9. See 35 U.S.C § 102. An invention that is determined not to be novel is said to be
“anticipated.” See infra Part I.A.
10. See 35 U.S.C. § 102. Specifically, section 102(b) states, “A person shall be entitled
to a patent unless . . . the invention was patented or described in a printed publication in this
or a foreign country or in public use or on sale in this country, more than one year prior to
the date of the application for patent.” Essentially, the prior art, or the current state of the
art, sets forth the technological background against which the novelty and nonobviousness of
an invention are examined. See C. Douglas Thomas, Secret Prior Art—Get Your Priorities
Straight!, 9 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 147, 148 (1996).
11. Burk & Lemley, supra note 2, at 372.
12. See Schering Corp., 339 F.3d at 1377.

168

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82

necessary consequence of what was intended.13 The Federal Circuit has
explained that the doctrine of inherent anticipation requires certainty of
result.14 If the missing feature of the invention is determined to be present
in a prior art reference as a result of an accident, the doctrine of inherent
anticipation is not invoked and the patent covering the invention is not
invalid for inherent anticipation.15
For decades, the case law invoking the doctrine suffered from conflicting
opinions on one particular issue: must a person having ordinary skill in the
art (commonly referred to as “PHOSITA”)16 recognize the existence of the
missing (inherent) feature?17 Some cases explained that a PHOSITA must
recognize the inherent feature before the doctrine may be used to defeat a
patent or some of its claims;18 others held the exact opposite, explaining
that inherent anticipation precludes patentability so long as the inherent
feature is an inevitable consequence of practicing the prior art, whether or
not PHOSITA recognizes the inherent feature.19 In its seminal—and
controversial—2003 decision, Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharmaceuticals,
Inc.,20 the Federal Circuit explained that the doctrine of inherent
anticipation does not require recognition of the inherent feature by a
PHOSITA.21
In Schering Corp., the Federal Circuit invalidated a patent claim to a
metabolite22 as inherently anticipated in light of the prior art, in this case a
patent for the parent drug.23 The court explained that the patent for the
parent drug precluded patentability of all of its future metabolites, presently
known or unknown, since all metabolites would necessarily be formed
when an individual ingests the parent drug.24 The Schering Corp. decision

13. See 1 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS, § 3.03[2][c] (2013) (citing Glaxo
Inc. v. Novopharm Ltd., 830 F. Supp. 871, 877 (E.D.N.C. 1993), aff’d, 52 F.3d 1043 (Fed.
Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 988 (1995) (finding that a method set forth an example in
one patent did not inherently anticipate claims to a variant form of a compound claimed in a
second patent because the “proper practice” of the example sometimes resulted in the
claimed form and sometimes resulted in another form)).
14. See Schering Corp., 339 F.3d at 1377 (“[A] prior art reference may anticipate
without disclosing a feature of the claimed invention if that missing characteristic is
necessarily present, or inherent, in the single anticipating reference.” (emphasis added)
(citing Cont’l Can Co. v. Monsanto Co., 948 F.2d 1264, 1268 (Fed. Cir. 1991))).
15. See Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707, 711–12 (1880).
16. For a more detailed description of the hypothetical person having ordinary skill in
the art (PHOSITA), see infra Part I.
17. See infra Part II.
18. See infra Part II.A.
19. See infra Part II.B.
20. 339 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
21. See id. at 1377 (“At the outset, this court rejects the contention that inherent
anticipation requires recognition in the prior art.”).
22. See id. at 1375 (“A metabolite is the compound formed in the patient’s body upon
ingestion of a pharmaceutical. The ingested pharmaceutical undergoes a chemical
conversion in the digestion process to form a new metabolite compound.”).
23. See id. at 1380.
24. See id. (“[T]he record shows that a patient ingesting [the parent drug] would
necessarily metabolize that compound to [a metabolite]. That later act would thus [be an act
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diverged from earlier precedent, however, in its holding vis-à-vis
metabolites: all future metabolites of a patented parent drug—whether or
not they are recognized by a PHOSITA at the time the parent drug is
patented—are inherently anticipated25 by the parent drug and are ineligible
for patent protection.26
Several commentators believe that the Schering Corp. decision represents
a carefully considered balancing act by a Federal Circuit attempting to
preserve the goals of the patent system27—namely, to foster innovation by
providing inventors with an exclusive time-limited monopoly to make their
invention on the one hand, and ensuring that the public receives the benefit
of the invention via full disclosure on the other.28 The Schering Corp.
decision may be explained in light of these public policy goals; perhaps the
court was concerned with what it perceived to be patent “evergreening.”29

of patent infringement]. Thus, a prior art reference showing administration of [the parent
drug] to a patient anticipates claims [to the metabolite].”).
25. Essentially, they are not “novel,” and fail the novelty requirement for patentability
under 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006).
26. See Schering Corp., 339 F.3d at 1380–81.
27. See Cynthia Chen, Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Inc.: Clarification of
the Inherent Anticipation Doctrine and Its Implications, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 95, 96
(2005) (“The Schering decision represents an effort by the Federal Circuit to balance two
conflicting goals of the patent system: to stimulate inventive efforts by giving inventors
exclusive rights for a limited period and to allow the public at large to derive benefits from
the advances in technology.”); Alfredo De La Rosa, A Hard Pill to Swallow: Does Schering
v. Geneva Endanger Innovation Within the Pharmaceutical Industry?, 8 COLUM. SCI. &
TECH. L. REV. 37, 87 (2007) (“Schering attempted to prevent generic drug manufacturers
from practicing the . . . patent, even after it had entered the public domain. The Federal
Circuit was understandably troubled by this notion.”); Mueller & Chisum, supra note 3, at
1163 (“In cases such as Schering, the Federal Circuit has wielded the doctrine of anticipation
by inherency as a rather blunt instrument to combat perceived patent evergreening.”).
28. See Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 63–64 (1998) (citing Seymour v.
Osborne, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 516, 533–34 (1870)). In Seymour, the Supreme Court
explained:
Letters patent are . . . public franchises granted to the inventors of new and useful
improvements for the purpose of securing to them, as such inventors, for the
limited term therein mentioned, the exclusive right and liberty to make and use and
vend to others to be used their own inventions, as tending to promote the progress
of science and the useful arts, and as matter of compensation to the inventors for
their labor, toil, and expense in making the inventions, and reducing the same to
practice for the public benefit, as contemplated by the Constitution and sanctioned
by the laws of Congress.
78 U.S. (11 Wall.) at 533–34.
29. Patent evergreening is not a formal patent law concept, but rather a strategy by
which a patentee obtains, or attempts to obtain, multiple patents that cover different aspects
of the same invention in an effort to extend the term of the patent and the exclusivity
privileges that come with it. See Andrx Pharms., Inc. v. Biovail Corp., 276 F.3d 1368, 1378
n.6 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (noting that new drug application (NDA) holders may evergreen their
patents “by filing a series of applications for different patents covering the same basic
drug”); see also Terry G. Mahn, Patenting Drug Products: Anticipating Hatch-Waxman
Issues During the Claims Drafting Process, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 245, 250 (1999)
(explaining that by filing and refiling “improvement” patents for the same basic drug—such
as disectable tablets, special coatings, new formulations, crystalline forms of the same drug,
and variations on drug delivery technologies—companies may essentially “evergreen their
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Although the effect the opinion will have on scientific innovation is
debatable,30 the rule promulgated under Schering Corp. has effectively
settled the argument for the time being about whether a PHOSITA must
recognize the inherent feature, unless and until the Supreme Court weighs
in.
In the Schering Corp. opinion, the Federal Circuit provided some
guidance to future patent drafters about how to circumvent the inherent
anticipation doctrine with respect to metabolites.31 In light of the rapid
advancement of the study of metabolites, and an ever-expanding base of
scientific knowledge in general, however, it behooves the Federal Circuit to
reexamine the inherent anticipation doctrine. This Note focuses on the
evolution and application of the inherent anticipation doctrine in the case
law.
Part I of this Note begins by providing a brief introduction to U.S. patent
law. Specifically, it focuses on the statutory provisions regarding novelty
and anticipation. It also outlines the evolution of the inherent anticipation
doctrine from early U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence.
Part II examines the intracircuit split that developed within the Federal
Circuit as the court struggled to determine whether PHOSITA recognition
of the inherent feature was necessary for a finding of inherent anticipation.
It then describes the Federal Circuit’s seminal decision in Schering Corp.
and predicts the future of metabolite research in the wake of the
controversial rule that PHOSITA recognition is dispensable in an inherent
anticipation analysis.
Finally, Part III examines proposals for changes to the inherent
anticipation doctrine. This Note then argues for a new “capability” standard
that would focus on what a PHOSITA was capable of discovering at the
time the prior art was published. This Note concludes by arguing that much
of the confusion in the inherent anticipation doctrine may be avoided by
simply focusing on what an inventor was capable of identifying at the time
of the prior art.
I. A PATENT LAW PRIMER
Mark Twain famously opined, “I knew that a country without a patent
office and good patent laws was just a crab, and couldn’t travel any way but
sideways or backwards.”32 The U.S. Constitution expressly mandates the
patent system, which in turn provides to inventors a time-limited monopoly
to make and practice their inventions, and to exclude others from doing the
drug patents”). One such evergreening example relevant to this Note could be the attempted
patenting of a derivative of an existing drug.
30. Compare Chen, supra note 27 (arguing that the necessary and inevitable
consequence test promulgated under Schering Corp. will not harm future metabolite
research), with De La Rosa, supra note 27 (arguing that the inherent anticipation doctrine
will endanger pharmaceutical innovation and encourage recourse to trade secrets).
31. See Schering Corp., 339 F.3d at 1381; see also infra Part II.C.
32. MARK TWAIN, A CONNECTICUT YANKEE IN KING ARTHUR’S COURT 72 (Bernard L.
Stein ed., Univ. of Cal. Press 3d ed. 1979) (1889).
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same.33 To be eligible for patent protection, however, an invention must
satisfy the basic requirements for patentability;34 specifically, the invention
must be new (i.e., novel), useful, and nonobvious. The requirement that an
invention be novel, prescribed by 35 U.S.C. § 102, is the cornerstone of the
patent system.35 Novelty is defeated, however, when the invention already
exists.36
To examine novelty, courts scrutinize the claimed invention in light of
the “prior art,”37 which represents the entirety of the “preexisting
knowledge and technology already available to the public.”38 The public
policy behind the novelty provision is to promote efficient research—to put
“libraries before laboratories, investigation before investment.”39 A
previously published document asserted against a claimed invention to
defeat its novelty is commonly referred to as a “prior art reference.”40 A
prior art reference defeats novelty when (1) it predates the applicant’s
invention, (2) it discloses each and every limitation41 of the claimed
invention (either expressly or inherently), and (3) it is enabling (the
reference teaches a person having ordinary skill in the art how to make and
use the invention without undue experimentation).42 When a prior art
33. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”). An applicant
whose invention satisfies the requirements of novelty, nonobviousness, and utility, and who
discloses his invention to the public is granted “the right to exclude others from using,
offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout the United States” for a period of 20
years. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2006).
34. See id. §§ 101–03.
35. See id. § 102; see also MARTIN J. ADELMAN ET AL., PATENT LAW IN A NUTSHELL 75
(2008) (“Novelty, the most fundamental characteristic of patentability, ensures that an
inventor has truly created something new.”).
36. See ADELMAN ET AL., supra note 35, at 75.
37. See 35 U.S.C. § 102. “Prior art” may refer to any printed publication, issued patent,
or other document asserted against the claimed invention to defeat its novelty.
38. Sean B. Seymore, Rethinking Novelty in Patent Law, 60 DUKE L.J. 919, 922 (2011);
see also Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 745 F.2d 1437, 1453 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
(“[T]he real reason for the denial of patent rights . . . is the basic principle (to which there are
minor exceptions) that no patent should be granted which withdraws from the public domain
technology already available to the public.” (citing Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6
(1966))).
39. ADELMAN ET AL., supra note 35, at 75.
40. Seymore, supra note 38, at 922.
41. Claim limitations stake out the limits of the patentee’s property right. See Renishaw
PLC v. Marposs Societa’ per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1248–49 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“[T]he
claims define the scope of the right to exclude; the claim construction inquiry, therefore,
begins and ends in all cases with the actual words of the claim.”). Thus, claim limitations
are the words of the claim detailing the specific elements of the invention. See ADELMAN ET
AL., supra note 35 at 218–19 (explaining that claims must describe complex subject matter in
terms broad enough to foresee and capture future related technology and narrow, or limited,
enough to distinguish all past related technology).
42. Seymore, supra note 38, at 922–23. The PHOSITA is a legal fiction of patent law,
considered to possess the normal skills and knowledge of a person in the field, without being
a genius. See Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 810 F.2d 1561, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1987)
(explaining that a PHOSITA is “not unlike the ‘reasonable man’ and other ghosts in the
law”). The PHOSITA is similar to the reasonably prudent person in tort law, and his
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reference successfully defeats the novelty of a claimed invention, that
invention is said to be “anticipated.”43 A finding of anticipation thus
renders the invention unpatentable as a result of the technology already
being within the public domain.44 Part I.A first describes anticipation
generally. Part I.B then traces the evolution of the inherent anticipation
doctrine, as it grew out of an earlier doctrine termed “accidental
anticipation.”
A. Anticipation Generally
A famous patent law adage recites, “That which infringes, if later, would
anticipate, if earlier.”45 A patent cannot issue on an invention or
technology already within the public domain; to allow a patentee an
exclusive monopoly over public technology is injurious to society as a
whole and does not incentivize innovation.46 The novelty provision
guarantees to the public the right to make and use that which it already
possesses.47
An invention that is anticipated by the prior art is not novel.48
Anticipation is a pure question of fact.49 Courts assess anticipation using a
two-step analysis: (1) by analyzing the current state of public knowledge as
indicated by the prior art, and (2) by examining each prior art reference
individually to determine if a single reference discloses each and every
limitation of the claimed invention.50 Assessing the novelty of a simple

hypothetical construction can change depending on several factors, such as “(1) the
educational level of the inventor; (2) type of problems encountered in the art; (3) prior art
solutions to those problems; (4) rapidity with which innovations are made; (5) sophistication
of the technology; and (6) educational level of active workers in the field.” Envtl. Designs,
Ltd. v. Union Oil Co., 713 F.2d 693, 696 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
43. See Verdegaal Bros. v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 814 F.2d 628, 631 (Fed. Cir. 1987)
(“A claim is anticipated only if each and every element as set forth in the claim is found,
either expressly or inherently described, in a single prior art reference.”).
44. See ADELMAN ET AL., supra note 35, at 75–76.
45. Peters v. Active Mfg. Co., 129 U.S. 530, 537 (1889).
46. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 148 (1989)
(stating that to allow a patentee a patent on an anticipated invention “would in fact injure the
public by removing existing knowledge from public use”); Graham v. John Deere Co., 383
U.S. 1, 5–6 (1966) (holding that it would be unconstitutional for Congress to authorize the
issuance of patents that would remove existing knowledge from the public domain).
47. See Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 745 F.2d 1437, 1453–54 (Fed. Cir.
1984). The Federal Circuit stated:
That is the real meaning of ‘prior art’ in legal theory—it is knowledge that is
available, including what would be obvious from it, at a given time, to a person of
ordinary skill in an art. Society, speaking through Congress and the courts, has said
“thou shalt not take it away.”
Id.
48. See Standard Havens Prods., Inc. v. Gencor Indus., Inc., 953 F.2d 1360, 1367 (Fed.
Cir. 1991) (citing Ralston Purina Co. v. Far-Mar-Co, Inc., 772 F.2d 1570, 1574 (Fed. Cir.
1985)).
49. See id. (“[A]nticipation is a factual determination.”).
50. See ADELMAN ET AL., supra note 35, at 76. The limitations of the claimed invention
are defined by the claims in the patent application. See id. at 218. The claims are “the fence
around the inventor’s property right,” defining the boundaries of the patentee’s right to
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invention might be a relatively trivial task.51 Determining the novelty of an
invention directed at more complex subject matter, however, proves an
increasingly difficult endeavor.52 For example, consider the interesting
case of Titanium Metals Corp. v. Banner.53 In Titanium Metals Corp., the
patent at issue was directed at a titanium-nickel-molybdenum alloy that
resisted corrosion in hot brine environments.54 The patent recited three
claims for a base titanium-nickel-molybdenum alloy consisting of 0.2
percent to 0.4 percent molybdenum and 0.6 percent to 0.9 percent nickel
that could also contain iron.55
The relevant prior art reference asserted against the patent to defeat its
novelty was a highly technical three-page Russian article in the Russian
language.56 The article displayed graphical data generated by various
titanium-nickel-molybdenum alloys, including one alloy having 0.25
percent molybdenum and 0.75 percent nickel by weight.57 Although the
Russian article did not disclose resistance to corrosion in hot brine
environments, the court held that the Russian article anticipated Claims 1
and 2 because the alloy was not new; the Russian alloy clearly fell within
the recited ranges of the claimed invention.58

exclude others from making, using, selling, offering to sell, and importing inventive
technology. See id. at 218.
51. See Seymore, supra note 38, at 923–25 (posing the example of a paper clip made
from an alloy of titanium and nickel; thus, an anticipating prior art reference must disclose a
paper clip made from titanium and nickel).
52. See id. For example, consider a patent directed at the chemical and biological arts
that discloses a specific drug X. Patents directed at drug molecules are typically broad in
scope, even though they disclose specific molecular structures, because the claims are
drafted in such a manner as to ensnare every compound using the basic molecular backbone
of the patented molecule. For example, U.S. Patent No. 5,422,351 is directed at “Bis-benzo
or benzopyrido cyclohepta piperidene, piperidylidene and piperazine compounds” and their
pharmaceutically acceptable salts having a particular structural formula, the claims of which
encompass at least one novemdecillion (1060, or one followed by sixty zeroes) separate
compounds. See Sean B. Seymore, The Presumption of Patentability, 97 MINN. L. REV. 990,
1028 n.225 (2012); see also U.S. Patent No. 5,422,351 (filed June 21, 1991).
53. 778 F.2d 775 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
54. See id. at 776.
55. See id. The claims at issue recited:
1. A titanium base alloy consisting essentially by weight of about 0.6% to 0.9%
nickel, 0.2% to 0.4% molybdenum, up to 0.2% maximum iron, balance titanium,
said alloy being characterized by good corrosion resistance in hot brine
environments.
2. A titanium base alloy as set forth in Claim 1 having up to 0.1% iron, balance
titanium.
3. A titanium base alloy as set forth in Claim 1 having 0.8% nickel, 0.3%
molybdenum, up to 0.1% maximum iron, balance titanium.
Id.
56. See id.
57. See id. at 776–77. This composition clearly falls within the claimed percentages
recited within claims 1 and 2 of the patent.
58. See id. at 782 (“[C]laims 1 and 2 . . . properly construed . . . are anticipated under
§ 102 by the Russian article which admittedly discloses an alloy on which these claims
read.”).
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Biotechnology inventions59 pose their own special problems when it
comes to anticipation.60 Notwithstanding the fact that laws of nature,
physical phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable,61 a patentee
must differentiate the claimed invention from any previously existing,
naturally occurring compounds to satisfy the novelty requirement.62 This
can be a daunting challenge, as much of life science research involves “the
elucidation of biological mechanisms already long present in nature.”63 A
patentee can successfully differentiate his invention from a naturally
occurring compound by isolating the compound in its purified form.64 This
challenge is especially difficult when the invention concerns metabolites.65
For example, secondary metabolites, which are derived from primary
metabolites, tend to be biologically synthesized in specialized cell types and
at distinct developmental stages, limiting their existence in time and
quantity.66
A patentee that manages to extract, purify, and isolate a useful metabolite
also faces a potential inherency problem.67 The nature of biological
research typically proceeds with some observable experimental finding only
to be understood long after the discovery, if at all.68 Thus, publication of an

59. This term refers to inventions in the biological, chemical and pharmaceutical arts.
60. See Paul G. Alloway, Inherently Difficult Analysis for Inherent and Accidental
Biotechnology Inventions, 38 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 73, 75 (2004) (“One problem with
biotechnology inventions is that they often relate to discoveries of already-existing natural
biological compositions or mechanisms.”).
61. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (describing the statutory requirements for patentable
subject matter). Section 101 states, “Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful
improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and
requirements of this title.” Id. The Supreme Court held that section 101 is not so broad as to
encompass naturally occurring biological or chemical products. See Diamond v.
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980).
62. See Alloway, supra note 60, at 75 (noting that inherency is “particularly
problematic” for biotechnology inventions because they often relate to discoveries of
already-existing natural biological compositions or mechanisms).
63. Jeffery M. Duncan, The Court Is Listening, LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 4, 2002, at 2.
64. See In re Bergstrom, 427 F.2d 1394, 1401–02 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (“[B]y definition,
pure materials necessarily differ from less pure or impure materials and, if the latter are the
only ones existing and available as a standard of reference . . . perforce the ‘pure’ materials
are ‘new’ with respect to them.”).
65. See Manuel F. Balandrin et al., Natural Plant Chemicals: Sources of Industrial and
Medicinal Materials, 228 SCIENCE 1154, 1154 (1985) (noting the problems in extracting,
isolating, and purifying primary and secondary metabolites); Gregory S. Walker et al.,
Validation of Isolated Metabolites from Drug Metabolism Studies As Analytical Standards
by Quantitative NMR, 39 DRUG METABOLISM & DISPOSITION 433, 433 (2011) (stating that
many metabolites are difficult and expensive to synthesize chemically).
66. See Balandrin, supra note 65, at 1154 (explaining that secondary metabolites are
frequently accumulated by organisms in smaller quantities than primary metabolites).
67. See Alloway, supra note 60, at 75 (“Inherency is particularly problematic for modern
biotechnology inventions. . . . [This is because] they often relate to discoveries of alreadyexisting natural biological compositions.”).
68. See id. at 76 (“A second problem that biotechnology inventions often encounter is
that particular observed biological results and underlying mechanisms of biological action
are often not understood until well after publication of initial experimental findings.”).
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initial finding can effectively preclude patent protection for a later
understanding via the doctrine of inherent anticipation.69
B. From Unwitting Result to Necessary Consequence:
The Evolution of the Inherent Anticipation Doctrine
Inherent anticipation grew out of an earlier doctrine referred to as
accidental anticipation,70 which was first discussed in the 1880 Supreme
Court case Tilghman v. Proctor.71 The Supreme Court held in Tilghman
that accidental production of a product, “unwittingly produced,” was not
anticipatory over Tilghman’s invention.72 Tilghman’s patent was directed
at a method of treating fats and oils by separating them into their respective
component parts “by the action of water at a high temperature and
pressure.”73 The Court eventually found Tilghman’s patent not invalid for
anticipation, noting that the process used by the accused infringer,
following instructions in the prior art, was never fully understood or
appreciated.74 As the Court rather bluntly stated, “[They] certainly never
derived the least hint from this accidental phenomenon in regard to any
practicable process for manufacturing such acids.”75 Although some
commentators would later disagree about the implications of the inherent
anticipation doctrine, they agree that the Court seemed to emphasize a
PHOSITA’s subjective appreciation in determining whether a prior art
reference triggers accidental or inherent anticipation.76
Tilghman, therefore, is a case of accidental anticipation, distinguished
from inherent anticipation by several factors.77 Although courts treat
69. See id. (noting that patenting biological and chemical entities is challenging in light
of both the doctrine of inherent anticipation and technological limitations that often delay
understanding).
70. See Anne Brown & Mark Polyakov, The Accidental and Inherent Anticipation
Doctrines: Where Do We Stand and Where Are We Going?, 4 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL.
PROP. L. 63, 63–65 (2004). The phrase “accidental anticipation” is misleading; pursuant to
this doctrine prior art does not anticipate under 35 U.S.C. § 102. See id.
71. See generally Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707 (1880).
72. Id. at 711. The Supreme Court continued:
If the acids were accidentally and unwittingly produced, whilst the operators were
in pursuit of other and different results, without exciting attention and without its
even being known what was done or how it had been done, it would be absurd to
say that this was an anticipation of Tilghman’s discovery.
Id. at 711–12.
73. Id. at 709.
74. See id. at 711.
75. Id.
76. See Chen, supra note 27, at 98 (“The Court emphasized the importance of subjective
appreciation in the anticipation analysis . . . .”); see also De La Rosa, supra note 27, at 45
(“The Court’s determination in Tilghman centers on the previous producer’s failure to
appreciate what had occurred through its actions.”).
77. Paul G. Alloway lists several factors that the Federal Circuit considers in
determining whether an accidental or inherent analysis is prudent, including:
whether the prior art intended the claimed composition or process; whether the
prior art includes knowledge of the claimed composition or process; whether the
prior art includes knowledge of the newly discovered result of the claimed process
or knowledge of the newly discovered function of the claimed composition;
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accidental and inherent anticipation as being separate legal theories,78
pinpointing which factor or set of factors a court will emphasize in
determining the type of anticipation is difficult.79 As previously mentioned,
a finding of inherent anticipation means that the patent-defeating result
inevitably and logically follows from an analysis of the cited prior art.80
The Federal Circuit’s predecessor, the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals (CCPA), explained in In re Oerlich,
Inherency . . . may not be established by probabilities or possibilities. The
mere fact that a certain thing may result from a given set of circumstances
is not sufficient. If, however, the disclosure is sufficient to show that the
natural result flowing from the operation as taught would result in the
performance of the questioned function, it seems to be well settled that the
disclosure should be regarded as sufficient.81

Allowing an applicant to possess intellectual property rights to a claimed
feature or invention that is inherent in the prior art “is not the law”; such a
policy would effectively “remove from the public that which is in the public
domain by virtue of its inclusion in . . . the prior art.”82 Although the
boundary between accidental and inherent anticipation is unclear, courts are
reluctant to provide patent protection for claimed inventions already
available to the public.83
Eibel Process Co. v. Minnesota & Ontario Paper Co.84 is another case of
accidental anticipation. In Eibel Process Co., the Supreme Court
considered a challenge to Eibel’s patent, which was directed at an improved
paper-making machine that elevated the pitch of paper-making wire.85 The
whether the prior art includes knowledge of a claimed component in the claimed
composition; whether the prior art includes knowledge of the function of a
component in a prior art process or composition; whether the prior art performs the
claimed process or makes or uses the claimed composition for a different purpose;
whether the claimed composition is useful in the prior art; whether the claimed
process is useful to achieve the claimed result in the prior art; and whether the
claimed process performs occasionally or under unusual conditions in the prior art
or the claimed composition is formed occasionally or under unusual conditions.
Alloway, supra note 60, at 91.
78. See Am. Original Corp. v. Jenkins Food Corp., 696 F.2d 1053, 1059 (4th Cir. 1982)
(holding that a patent directed to the hydraulic evisceration of mollusks was valid in light of
accidental occurrences of incidental shearing in the prior art). But see Bird Provision Co. v.
Owens Country Sausage, Inc., 568 F.2d 369, 375 (5th Cir. 1978) (finding a patent covering a
method of processing and packaging of pork sausage invalid for inherent anticipation under
the prior art, because “the discovery of the process’ shelf life implications involved nothing
that was new in its use or method of application”).
79. See Alloway, supra note 60, at 91–93.
80. See In re Oelrich, 666 F.2d 578, 581 (C.C.P.A. 1981).
81. Id. (quoting Hansgirg v. Kemmer, 102 F.2d 212, 214 (C.C.P.A. 1939)).
82. In re Wiseman, 596 F.2d 1019, 1023 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
83. See, e.g., Gen. Elec. Co. v. Jewel Incandescent Lamp Co., 326 U.S. 242, 249 (1949)
(“It is not invention to perceive that the product which others had discovered had qualities
they failed to detect.”); In re Wiseman, 596 F.2d at 1023; In re Finsterwalder, 436 F.2d
1028, 1033 (C.C.P.A. 1971) (affirming the rejections of claims in a patent application as
obvious in view of the prior art).
84. 261 U.S. 45 (1923).
85. See id. at 52.
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challengers cited prior art references that described machines that used a
similar pitch solely for drainage purposes.86 The Court found no evidence
that any pitch of the wire, before Eibel, had produced Eibel’s results, and
that the challenger’s results were produced under unusual conditions, “not
intended and not appreciated.”87 While the Court did not find inherent
anticipation, it did provide guidance for future courts, explaining that if the
alleged discovery or invention advanced the art substantially, “then the
court is liberal in its construction of the patent, to secure to the inventor the
reward he deserves.”88
The circumstances giving rise to Tilghman and Eibel Process Co. are
quite rare and, as a result, these cases continue to be good law.89
Nevertheless, the accidental anticipation doctrine, received further
clarification from the Supreme Court in 1949. In General Electric Co. v.
Jewel Incandescent Lamp Co.,90 the Court stated that simply finding latent
qualities in an old discovery and adapting them to a useful end did not meet
the exacting standards of the U.S. patent system.91 Discovery of an existing
quality did not “advance the frontiers of science.”92 The court’s decision in
General Electric Co. did, however, allow for the possibility of patent
protection for the discovery of a new quality within an old invention, so
long as it advanced the public’s scientific knowledge.93
Thus, Tilghman, Eibel Process Co., and several lower court decisions
that followed generally stand for the proposition that accidental
achievements do not anticipate later inventions.94 For example, the Second
Circuit held that anticipation was not established when a prior user did not
appreciate or have knowledge of the results, stating that “novelty is not
negatived by a prior accidental production of the same thing when the
operator does not recognize the means by which the accidental result is
accomplished, and no knowledge of them, or of the method of their
employment, is derived from the prior use by any one.”95 The Third Circuit
similarly held that prior production of an alloy, when unknown by its
producers and unappreciated as a new product, was “without value as an
anticipation.”96 Finally, the Sixth Circuit held that the prior accidental

86. See id. at 58.
87. Id. at 66 (citing Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707, 711 (1880)).
88. Id. at 63.
89. See De La Rosa, supra note 27, at 45–46.
90. 326 U.S. 242 (1945).
91. See id. at 248–49.
92. Id. at 249.
93. See id. at 248–49.
94. See, e.g., Eibel Process Co. v. Minn. & Ont. Paper Co., 261 U.S. 45, 66 (1923);
Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707, 711–12 (1880); Pittsburgh Iron & Steel Foundries Co. v.
Seaman-Sleeth Co., 248 F. 705, 709 (3d Cir. 1918); Toch v. Zibell Damp Resisting Paint
Co., 233 F. 993, 997 (2d Cir. 1916); Munising Paper Co. v. Am. Sulphite Pulp Co., 228 F.
700, 703–04 (6th Cir. 1915).
95. Toch, 233 F. at 995.
96. Pittsburgh Iron & Steel, 248 F. at 709.
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production of the same invention with characteristics not recognized until
the later patent issued did not constitute anticipation.97
As this Note next describes, when the doctrine of accidental anticipation
evolved into inherent anticipation, however, the Federal Circuit vacillated
on the issue of whether or not PHOSITA recognition of the inherent
characteristic was required for a finding of inherent anticipation.98 Until
the Schering Corp. decision essentially ended the debate in 2003, two
schools of thought had emerged in an intracircuit split within the Federal
Circuit regarding this issue.99
II. A PERSON HAVING ORDINARY SKILL IN THE ART MUST (SOMETIMES)
RECOGNIZE THE INHERENT FEATURE: AN INTRACIRCUIT SPLIT
Whether or not a prior art reference anticipates an invention is a factual
determination.100 When a single prior art reference expressly discloses
each and every limitation of the claimed invention, an anticipation analysis
is straightforward and the invention is unpatentable for failure to satisfy the
novelty requirement under 35 U.S.C. § 102.101 But does a prior art
reference anticipate an invention when it does not expressly disclose each
and every limitation of the claimed invention?102 If it does anticipate, must
a PHOSITA recognize the missing limitations of the claimed invention for
that reference to preclude patentability?103 As this section will describe, the
Federal Circuit has not always provided clear guidance on these issues.
Part II.A explores the beginnings of the intracircuit split within Federal
Circuit case law, holding essentially that a prior art reference anticipates an
invention when it inherently104 discloses each and every limitation of that
invention and a PHOSITA recognizes the inherent feature. Part II.B
outlines recent Federal Circuit case law in which the inherent anticipation
doctrine is upheld but a PHOSITA need not recognize the inherent feature.
Part II.C describes in detail the interesting case of Schering Corp. v. Geneva

97. See Munising Paper Co., 228 F. at 703.
98. See Chisum, supra note 13, § 3.03[2][c].
99. See De La Rosa, supra note 27, at 44–52.
100. See supra notes 46–48.
101. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006).
102. The simple answer to this question is yes. See Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharms.,
Inc., 339 F.3d 1373, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“Patent law nonetheless establishes that a prior
art reference which expressly or inherently contains each and every limitation of the claimed
subject matter anticipates and invalidates.” (emphasis added) (citing EMI Group N. Am.,
Inc., v. Cypress Semiconductor Corp., 268 F.3d 1342, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2001))).
103. As of the publication date of this Note, the short answer to this question is no. See id.
at 1377.
104. The Federal Circuit explained in Schering Corp.:
In this court’s . . . inherency cases, a single prior art reference generally contained
an incomplete description of the anticipatory subject matter, i.e., a partial
description missing certain aspects. Inherency supplied the missing aspect of the
description. Upon proof that the missing description is inherent in the prior art,
that single prior art reference placed the claimed subject matter in the public
domain.
Id. at 1378–79.
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Pharmaceuticals, Inc., the seminal Federal Circuit case on this issue.
Finally, Part II.D examines predictions about the state of metabolite
research in the wake of the Schering Corp. decision.
A. PHOSITA Recognition Required
The Tilghman case, although largely considered a case of accidental
anticipation,105 was one of the first cases to state that PHOSITA
appreciation of the inherent characteristics in the prior art was necessary for
a finding of inherent anticipation.106 The threshold inquiry for similar cases
now also categorized as accidental anticipation was whether a PHOSITA
recognized and appreciated the value of the invention.107
The 1964 case In re Seaborg supports the proposition that PHOSITA
recognition is required for inherent anticipation.108 Although the CCPA
decided the case, the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982 merged the
CCPA with the appellate branch of the Court of Claims,109 establishing this
case as Federal Circuit precedent. The patent in question was directed at
Americium (element 95, hereinafter Am), its isotopes, and the methods of
isolating and purifying it.110 The patent application was initially rejected in
light of the prior art, specifically that Am had already been produced in the
Fermi reactor.111 The applicant responded that the Am produced could only
have been one billionth of a gram “distributed throughout forty tons of
intensely radioactive uranium reactor fuel,” and that such an amount would
surely be undetectable if it was present at all.112 The court examined the
prior art in light of the present technology, and concluded that a prediction
“with any degree of definiteness” about the formation of Am would require
an “exercise of more than the ordinary skill of the art.”113 Because a
PHOSITA could not possibly recognize or produce Am from the prior art,
the patent was granted.114
When the CCPA decided the case In re Shetty a little over a decade later,
PHOSITA recognition as a prerequisite for inherent anticipation seemed all
but a bright-line rule.115 The invention claimed was “a method . . . of
curbing appetite in animals by administering certain adamantane
compounds,” and also pertained to the unit dosage form of a composition
for curbing appetite comprising such adamantane compounds along with a

105. See CHISUM, supra note 13, § 3.03[1][a]; Chen, supra note 27, at 97–98; De La
Rosa, supra note 27 at 45–46.
106. See Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707, 711–12 (1880).
107. See, e.g., Eibel Process Co. v. Minn. & Ont. Paper Co., 261 U.S. 45 (1923); Edison
Elec. Light Co. v. Novelty Incandescent Light Co., 167 F. 977 (3d Cir. 1909).
108. See In re Seaborg, 328 F.2d 996, 998–99 (C.C.P.A. 1964).
109. See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
110. See In re Seaborg, 328 F.2d at 996–97.
111. See id.
112. Id. at 997.
113. Id. at 999.
114. See id.
115. See In re Shetty, 566 F.2d 81, 85 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
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pharmaceutically acceptable carrier.116 The Patent and Trademark Board of
Appeals had originally rejected the claims as obvious or anticipated in light
of the prior art.117 The CCPA affirmed the Board’s decision as to one claim
being invalid for obviousness, but reversed it on the other five.118 The
court stated, “[Inherency] is quite immaterial if, as the record establishes
here, one of ordinary skill in the art would not appreciate or recognize that
inherent result.”119
The Federal Circuit again held that PHOSITA appreciation of the
inherent feature was required for a finding of inherent anticipation in Glaxo
Inc. v. Novopharm, Ltd.120 That case concerned ranitidine hydrochloride, a
“potent histamine blocker” that “inhibit[s] the secretion of stomach
acid.”121 Glaxo Inc. received a patent (U.S. Patent No. 4,128,658 or the
‘658 patent) for ranitidine hydrochloride in 1978.122 In 1980, Glaxo ceased
development of ranitidine using the method claimed in the ‘658 patent, and
instead used a more efficient method that “yielded ranitidine hydrochloride
identical in all respects to that originally produced” under the old
method.123 The new method, however, produced a crystalline version of
the drug that was “visibly different from all previous batches of the salt.”124
This new crystalline version, a polymorph, was better suited for commercial
applications, and was subsequently patented as U.S. Patent No. 4,521,431
(the ‘431 patent).125 In 1991, Novopharm Ltd., one of Glaxo’s competitors,
filed an Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) with the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA), seeking approval to manufacture and sell a
generic version of the ‘431 patent material in December of 1995, when the
‘658 patent was set to expire.126 Glaxo then sued Novopharm for patent
infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2).127 Novopharm admitted

116. Id. at 82.
117. See id.
118. See id. at 86–87.
119. Id. at 86 (quoting In re Naylor, 369 F.2d 765, 788 (C.C.P.A. 1966)).
120. 52 F.3d 1043, 1046 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
121. Id.
122. See id.
123. See id.
124. Id.
125. See id. at 1045.
126. See id. at 1046–47. December 1995 was still, however, long before the expiration
date of the ‘431 patent, which was set to expire in 2002. See id.
127. See id. at 1047. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2) provides in part,
It shall be an act of infringement to submit—
(A) an application under section 505(j) of the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act or described in section 505(b)(2) of such Act for a drug claimed in a
patent or the use of which is claimed in a patent . . .
....
if the purpose of such submission is to obtain approval under such Act to engage in
the commercial manufacture, use, or sale of a drug or veterinary or biological
product claimed in a patent or the use of which is claimed in a patent before the
expiration of such patent.
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infringement of the claims, but countered that that ‘431 patent was invalid
for anticipation by the ‘658 patent.128
The Federal Circuit stated that a claim is only anticipated if a single prior
art reference expressly or inherently encompasses all the limitations of that
claim.129 For a finding of inherent anticipation, it was necessary that a
PHOSITA appreciate the inherently missing characteristics.130 The district
court below found the ‘431 patent valid and infringed because the ‘658
patent did not always produce the ‘431 polymorph of ranitidine
hydrochloride, and in so doing expressly rejected the anticipation
argument.131 The Federal Circuit affirmed because the district court’s
ruling was not clearly erroneous.132
The first open conflict between the two schools of thought on inherent
anticipation occurred in Elan Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Mayo Foundation for
Medical Education and Research.133 The patent at issue was directed
toward a method of generating transgenic mice.134 The district court below
held Elan’s patents (U.S. Patent Nos. 5,612,486 and 5,850,003 or the ‘486
and ‘003 patents, respectively) invalid for anticipation by the Mullan patent
(U.S. Patent No. 5,455,169 or the ‘169 patent).135 The majority opinion
authored by Judge Newman reversed the district court’s finding, holding
that the legal requirements were not met to establish anticipation.136 The
Federal Circuit panel found no inherent anticipation, stating, “The single
reference must describe and enable the claimed invention, including all
claim limitations, with sufficient clarity and detail to establish that the
subject matter already existed in the prior art and that its existence was
recognized by persons of ordinary skill in the field of the invention.”137
Judge Newman’s opinion pointed out that “[a]lthough Mullan described
known procedures for making a transgenic animal, he neither described
35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2) (2006). Thus, the act of filing an ANDA is deemed to be an act of
infringement, enabling the patent holder (Glaxo Inc.) to bring a lawsuit prior to FDA
approval, if the purpose of such ANDA is to obtain FDA approval prior to the expiration of a
patent that claims the use of the drug.
128. Glaxo Inc., 52 F.3d at 1047.
129. See id. at 1047.
130. Id.
131. See id. at 1047.
132. See id. at 1047–48.
133. 304 F.3d 1221 (Fed. Cir. 2002), vacated, 314 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (en banc),
aff’d on other grounds, 346 F.3d 1051 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
134. See id. at 1221. These transgenic mice were genetically altered to contain, in
addition to their normal mouse genome, a mutated human gene called the “Swedish
mutation,” because the gene was isolated from the cells of a Swedish family having an
unusually high incidence of early-onset Alzheimer's disease. Id. at 1223–24. These
transgenic mice would produce a detectable amount of amyloid precursor protein (APP),
which is common in brains of people with Alzheimer's disease. See id.
135. See id. at 1223.
136. See id. The ‘169 patent issued after Dr. Mullan located a Swedish family susceptible
to Alzheimer’s disease, isolated the mutated gene and its protein, and expressed the
mutation. See id. at 1224. He did not, however, make a transgenic mouse. See id. at 1226.
By contrast, the ‘486 and ‘003 patents encompassed the limitations of transgenic mice and
the unpredictability of their production. See id. at 1226–27.
137. Id. at 1227–28 (emphasis added).
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every element of the claims, nor taught, in terms other than by trial and
error and hope, production of a transgenic mouse.”138 In support of this
holding, Judge Newman recited Elan’s argument that successful transgenic
mice production was unpredictable, so much so that the transgenic mouse
was produced by Mayo’s technology on the 2,576th attempt.139
The first Elan decision prompted a strong dissent from Judge Dyk, who
was concerned that the panel’s decision allowed for patenting “existing
inventions” while at the same time contradicting recent Federal Circuit case
law.140 As to the issue of inherency, Judge Dyk stated, “It matters not that
those of ordinary skill heretofore may not have recognized these inherent
characteristics.”141
After reconsideration en banc, the first Elan decision was vacated and the
case was remanded to the panel for further consideration. In the second
panel decision, Judge Newman stated that the patent was not invalid for
inherent anticipation because the prior art reference was nonenabling.142
Judge Newman did make it clear that, in her opinion, an enabling prior art
reference alone was insufficient to find inherent anticipation.143 The
Federal Circuit then remanded the case for a determination of whether the
‘169 patent enabled a PHOSITA to make and use the invention without
undue experimentation.144
Although there seems ample precedent in the case law that a finding of
inherent anticipation requires that a PHOSITA recognize and appreciate the
inherent characteristics, the opposite—namely that a PHOSITA need not
recognize the inherent feature—also enjoyed substantial support in the case
law.
B. PHOSITA Recognition Not Required
The second school of thought regarding inherent anticipation has been
championed primarily by Judge Rader, and expressly disregards PHOSITA
recognition as necessary to establish a finding of inherent anticipation.145
In Abbott Laboratories v. Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,146 for example,
recognition of inherent characteristics was irrelevant for patentability.147
The patent at issue in Abbott Laboratories concerned Abbott’s “Form IV”
anhydrous terazosin hydrochloride, a drug to treat hypertension and “benign
prostatic hyperplasia,” and was issued as U.S. Patent No. 5,504,207 (the

138. Id. at 1228 (emphasis added).
139. See id. at 1228 n.4.
140. Id. at 1231 (Dyk, J., dissenting).
141. Id. (citing In re Cruciferous Sprout Litig., 301 F.3d 1343, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).
142. See Elan Pharms. Inc. v. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research, 346 F.3d 1051,
1054 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“We conclude that Elan’s arguments are more properly characterized
as enablement arguments rather than inherency arguments.”).
143. See id. at 1055.
144. See id. at 1057.
145. See, e.g., Chen, supra note 27, at 101–02; De La Rosa, supra note 27, at 71–83.
146. 182 F.3d 1315 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
147. See id. at 1319.
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‘207 patent).148 Between 1989 and 1992, Byron Chemical Company, who
was not a party to the lawsuit, sold three lots of anhydrous terazosin
hydrochloride: two to Geneva Pharmaceuticals and one to Warner Chilcott
Laboratories.149 Abbott developed the Warner Chilcott lot into its “Form
IV” product and filed its patent application in 1994.150
Three of Abbott’s competitors—Novopharm Ltd.; Invamed, Inc.; and
Geneva Pharmaceuticals—filed ANDAs seeking approval to make and
distribute generic versions of the ‘207 material containing the Form IV
anhydrate.151 Abbott sued for infringement pursuant to 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(e)(2)(A).152 The competitors countered that the ‘207 patent was
invalid, and therefore not infringed, because the claimed material violated
the § 102(b) on-sale statutory bar, “asserting that Form IV was anticipated
because it was sold in the United States more than one year before the ‘207
patent’s filing date, October 18, 1994.”153 Abbott tried to argue that neither
Byron Chemical nor the defendants knew that the “invention” (Form IV
anhydrate) was “on sale” because “the parties must ‘conceive,’ or know
precisely, the nature of the subject matter with which they are dealing.”154
The Federal Circuit was not persuaded.155 Instead, the court focused its
inquiry on the three commercial sales that occurred before the critical filing
date of October 18, 1994, noting that the subjective knowledge of the
parties to the sale was irrelevant.156 The court, rejecting Abbott’s
argument, stated, “If a product that is offered for sale inherently possesses
each of the limitations of the claims, then the invention is on sale, whether
or not the parties to the transaction recognize that the product possesses the
claimed characteristics.”157 Thus, an inquiry into whether the parties—both
PHOSITAs—knew (recognized or appreciated) at the time that they were
dealing with Form IV anhydrate or not was immaterial to the analysis of
inherent properties and their effect on patentability.158
Atlas Powder Co. v. IRECO Inc.159 follows similar reasoning. Judge
Rader authored the opinion in Atlas Powder Co., explicitly holding,
“Inherency is not necessarily coterminous with the knowledge of those of
ordinary skill in the art.”160 The court explained, “Insufficient prior
understanding of the inherent properties of a known composition does not
defeat a finding of anticipation.”161 In Atlas Powder Co., the Federal

148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Id. at 1316–17.
See id. at 1317.
See id. at 1318.
See id. at 1317.
See id. at 1317 n.1.
Id. at 1317; see 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006).
Abbott Labs., 182 F.3d at 1318.
See id.
See id. at 1319.
Id.
See id.
190 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
Id. at 1347.
Id. at 1349.
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Circuit considered two patents—the Clay patent (U.S. Patent No.
4,111,727), and its reissue patent (U.S. Patent No. RE 33,788). The district
court held both the Clay patent and its reissue patent invalid for anticipation
by either the Egly patent (U.S. Patent No. 3,161,551) or by the Butterworth
patent (U.K. Patent No. 1,306,546).162 Both the Clay patent and its reissue
patent claimed explosive compositions composed of ammonium nitrate and
fuel oil (ANFO) as well as an unsensitized water-in-oil emulsion.163
Although the anticipating prior art references did not encompass the exact
chemical compositions as the Clay and reissue patents, they did disclose
blasting compositions containing a water-in-oil emulsion and ANFO with
ingredients identical to those of the Clay patents in overlapping amounts.164
The Egly and Butterworth patents did not explicitly disclose a “sufficient
aeration” limitation, however, which was explicitly included in the Clay
patent disclosure.165 The Federal Circuit found that the aeration limitation
was “inevitably and inherently” present in the prior art, thus rendering the
claims of the Clay and reissue patents unpatentable.166 Judge Rader, in
affirming the district court’s holding, stated, “this court detects no error in
the district court’s conclusion that ‘sufficient aeration . . . to enhance
sensitivity’ is understood by those of ordinary skill in the art.”167 Because
“sufficient aeration” was inherently present in the prior art, “it is irrelevant
that the prior art did not recognize the key aspect of [the Clay patent’s]
alleged invention.”168
Titanium Metals Corp. of America v. Banner169 further supports the idea
that insufficient understanding or appreciation by those of ordinary skill in
the art should not defeat a finding of anticipation. In that case, the Federal
Circuit held a patent invalid for inherent anticipation even though a critical
property of the claimed alloy was not expressly disclosed in the prior art
reference.170 In reversing the district court, the Federal Circuit held that
inherent anticipation was established even though a PHOSITA did not
appreciate the inherent property of “good corrosion resistance in hot brine
environments,” despite the fact that such a property was a newly discovered
characteristic.171 Thus, Titanium Metals Corp. and Atlas Powder Co. seem
to stand for the proposition that inherent anticipation may be established
whether or not a PHOSITA knows or appreciates the inherent feature or
characteristic.
Cases following similar reasoning are MEHL/Biophile International
Corp. v. Milgraum172 and In re Cruciferous Sprout Litigation.173 In
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

See id. at 1343.
See id. at 1344.
See id. at 1345.
Id. at 1344–45.
Id. at 1348.
Id. at 1347.
Id. at 1348.
778 F.2d 775 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
See id. at 780–81.
Id. at 782.
192 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
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Cruciferous Sprout, several patents directed at the production and
consumption of the sprouts of certain types of cruciferous seeds (such as
broccoli and cauliflower) were held invalid for anticipation.174 The
patented sprouts are rich in glucosinolates, which have high Phase 2
enzyme-inducing potential and therefore make them potent anticancer
agents.175 The defendants claimed that the patents were invalid for
anticipation in light of the prior art, which disclosed methods for
germinating and harvesting cruciferous seeds without explicitly disclosing
the importance of glucosinolates.176 The district court below granted the
defendants’ motion for summary judgment, stating that “plant[s] (broccoli
sprouts), long well known in nature and cultivated and eaten by humans for
decades, [cannot] be patented merely on the basis of a recent realization that
the plant has always had some heretofore unknown but naturally occurring
beneficial feature.”177 The Federal Circuit affirmed, holding that the
patents were anticipated in light of the prior art, stating that, “the
glucosinolate content and Phase 2 enzyme-inducing potential of these
sprouts are inherent properties of the sprouts put there by nature, not by [the
patentee].”178 The discovery of inherent, unappreciated properties of
previously patented products was not the discovery of something new, and
thus, was not worthy of patent protection.
In MEHL/Biophile, the Federal Circuit held that a patent claiming a
method of hair removal using lasers was invalid for anticipation in light of a
prior art article teaching the “alignment of the laser light over a hair
follicle.”179 Judge Rader again wrote the opinion, stating that it was “of no
import[ance]” that the prior art reference’s authors did not appreciate the
necessary consequence of what was deliberately intended.180
C. Settling the Debate, for Now: Schering Corp. v. Geneva
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
The Federal Circuit issued its landmark ruling on the subject of inherent
anticipation in the case of Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharmaceuticals,
Inc.,181 holding that recognition of the inherent feature in a prior art
reference by a PHOSITA was not necessary to sustain a finding of inherent
anticipation.182 Part II.C.1 will outline the procedural history of Schering
Corp. Part II.C.2 will discuss the case on appeal to the Federal Circuit.
Part II.C.3 then concludes by highlighting the Federal Circuit’s denial of en
banc review.

173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

301 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
See id. at 1352.
See id. at 1345.
See id. at 1346.
Id.
Id. at 1352.
MEHL/Biophile Int’l Corp. v. Milgraum, 192 F.3d 1362, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
Id.
339 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
See id. at 1377.
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1. The Procedural History
The District of New Jersey granted summary judgment invalidating
claims in Schering Corporation’s patent (U.S. Patent No. 4,659,716 or the
‘716 patent) directed at antihistamines.183 Schering also owned U.S. Patent
No. 4,282,233 (the ‘233 patent), likewise directed at antihistamines,
specifically loratadine, the pharmacologically active ingredient in
Claritin.184 The ‘716 patent covered descarboethoxyloratadine (DCL), a
metabolically formed byproduct of loratadine.185 Structurally, loratadine
and DCL differ only in that loratadine has a carboethoxy group on a ring
nitrogen, while DCL has a hydrogen atom on that ring nitrogen.186 The
Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling, finding that the ‘233
patent inherently anticipates the ‘716 patent.187
The defendant pharmaceutical companies sought to manufacture generic
versions of Claritin upon the expiration of the ‘233 patent, with each
appellee submitting applications to the FDA.188 The applications contained
a certification denying the validity of the ‘716 patent, which was listed in
the Orange Book for loratadine.189 Upon receiving notice of the FDA
filings, Schering filed suit for patent infringement pursuant to 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(e)(2)(A).190 Cross motions for summary judgment were filed by both
parties.191
The claims as construed by the district court covered DCL in all of its
forms, including “metabolized within the human body” and “synthetically
produced in a purified and isolated form.”192 Both parties agreed to that
claim construction, and further stipulated that, at the time the ‘716
application was filed, a PHOSITA would not recognize that administration
of loratadine produced the metabolite DCL in the human body.193 The
district court then found that the ‘233 patent did not expressly disclose
DCL, but that DCL was necessarily formed as a result of practicing the
‘233 patent.194 By 1985, Schering and its scientists “consistently
183. See id. at 1374. “Antihistamines inhibit the histamines that cause allergic
symptoms.” Id. at 1375.
184. See id. at 1374–75.
185. See id. at 1375.
186. See id.
187. See id. at 1374.
188. See id. at 1376.
189. See id. The FDA publishes the Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic
Equivalence Evaluations, commonly referred to as the Orange Book, which identifies drug
products approved on the basis of safety and effectiveness by the FDA under the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(7)(A)(iii), (b)(1) (2006). The book is
known popularly as the “Orange Book” because of its orange-colored cover. See
Applications for FDA Approval to Market a New Drug, 68 Fed. Reg. 36676 (June 18, 2003)
(to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 314).
190. Schering Corp., 339 F.3d at 1376.
191. See id.
192. Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 275 F. Supp. 2d 534, 539 (D.N.J. 2002),
aff’d, 339 F.3d 1373, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
193. See id. at 537.
194. See id. at 541.
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characterized DCL as the ‘active metabolite’ of loratadine in humans . . .
the ‘major active circulating metabolite’ of loratadine in humans, and a
‘known active metabolite’ of loratadine in humans in scientific
publications.”195
The district court invalidated several claims of the ‘716 patent as
inherently anticipated, noting that, “there [was] no genuine issue that the
consumption of loratadine by humans, with a wide variety of health
statuses, necessarily results in the natural production in the human body of
the DCL metabolite.”196 The court explained that, “the natural, inevitable
production of metabolic DCL upon human ingestion of loratadine, although
not fully appreciated by persons of ordinary skill in that field until more
recently than 1984, demonstrates that this process is an ‘inherent
characteristic or functioning’ of the use of loratadine.”197 Thus, the
defendants’ motion for summary judgment was granted invalidating
Schering’s patent, and Schering appealed to the Federal Circuit.
2. The Appeal to the Federal Circuit
The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling of summary
judgment, holding the ‘716 patent invalid for inherent anticipation in light
of the prior art.198 The court used this case to explain the proper
interpretation of previous case law—a prior art reference may anticipate
without disclosing a feature of the claimed invention if: (1) that missing
characteristic is necessarily present, or inherent, in the single anticipating
reference, and (2) that inherency was a “natural result” that flowed with
certainty from the disclosure in the prior art.199 Cases like Tilghman and
Eibel Process Co. were distinguished as cases dealing “with ‘accidental,
unwitting, and unappreciated’ anticipation,” standing for the proposition
that inherency did not require recognition by a PHOSITA.200 When the
result in question is deemed born out of accidental conditions, such results
do not run afoul of the novelty provision for patentability.201
The Federal Circuit stated frankly, in an opinion authored by Judge
Rader, “At the outset, this court rejects the contention that inherent
anticipation requires recognition in the prior art.”202 Thus, the Schering
Corp. decision resolved the long standing intracircuit split,203 making it
quite clear a prior art reference anticipates even when it fails to disclose a
feature of the claimed invention, so long as the missing characteristic is
“necessarily present, or inherent” in that reference.204 Judge Rader used

195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

Id. at 538.
Id. at 541.
Id. at 542.
See Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 339 F.3d 1373, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
Id. at 1378–79.
Id. at 1378.
See id.
Id. at 1377 (emphasis added).
See supra Part II.A–B and accompanying text.
Schering Corp., 339 F.3d at 1377.
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this opportunity to clarify prior Federal Circuit cases that were previously
viewed as holding that a PHOSITA must recognize the missing (inherent)
characteristic to support a finding of inherent anticipation.205 For instance,
the court remarked that Continental Can Co. v. Monsanto Co., stood “for
the proposition that inherency, like anticipation itself, requires a
determination of the meaning of the prior art.”206 Therefore, the Federal
Circuit did not require PHOSITA recognition. Rather, it merely attempted
to view the scope of the relevant prior art through the eyes of a PHOSITA,
and thus resolve any factual questions about the subject matter expressly
and inherently within the references under examination.207 In other words,
the court observed that Continental Can Co. merely requires that the
Federal Circuit resort to the opinions of “skilled artisans” to determine if
the inherent feature exists in the prior art at all.208 Moreover, according to
Judge Rader, summary judgment on inherent anticipation in Continental
Can Co. was vacated due to conflicting expert testimonies on the existence
of the inherent feature.209
After dispensing with the argument that inherent anticipation requires
PHOSITA recognition of the inherent feature, the court described the issue
in Schering Corp. as being one “of first impression.”210 The court noted
that the prior art references put forward by the defendants “supplie[d] no
express description of any part of the claimed subject matter.”211 Previous
Federal Circuit case law contained examples of prior art references having
an “incomplete description of the anticipatory subject matter,” with the
inherency doctrine supplying the missing feature.212 By contrast, the
defendants in Schering Corp. were not seeking to use the inherent
anticipation doctrine to plug gaps in the prior art. They were, instead,
“ask[ing] [the] court to find anticipation when the entire structure of the
claimed subject matter is inherent in the prior art.”213 Judge Rader found
no reason why the doctrine of inherent anticipation should be limited to
situations involving an undisclosed feature.214 Judge Rader’s opinion in
Schering Corp. has made it clear that the doctrine of inherent anticipation
may well be used to invalidate entire inventions.215

205. See id. (“Continental Can does not stand for the proposition that an inherent feature
of a prior art reference must be perceived as such by a person of ordinary skill in the art
before the critical date.”).
206. Id.
207. See id. at 1377–78.
208. Id. at 1378.
209. See id.; see also Cont’l Can Co. v. Monsanto Co., 948 F.2d 1264, 1268–69 (Fed. Cir.
1991).
210. Schering Corp., 339 F.3d at 1378.
211. Id. (noting that the prior art ‘233 patent did not expressly disclose any compound
identifiable as DCL).
212. Id. at 1378–79.
213. Id. at 1379 (emphasis added). The “new” structure claimed, DCL, was not at all
described by the prior ‘233 patent. Id. at 1379.
214. See id.
215. See id.

2013]

PROBLEMS AFTER SCHERING CORP.?

189

The Schering Corp. decision also clarified that an anticipatory reference
“need only enable subject matter that falls within the scope of the claims at
issue, nothing more.”216 Actual creation or reduction to practice of the
prior art subject matter are not required for the purposes of an anticipation
inquiry.217 Applying this rule to the facts in Schering Corp., the court
found that the ‘233 patent qualified as an enabling anticipatory reference if
it “describe[d] how to make DCL in any form encompassed by a compound
claim covering DCL . . . .”218 This, then, would include DCL as a
metabolite in a patient’s body. Since the ‘716 patent covers DCL in any
form, the ‘233 patent would then inherently anticipate its claims so long as
it enables a PHOSITA to make DCL. Because a PHOSITA could practice
the ‘233 patent without undue experimentation, the ‘233 patent enables and
is an anticipatory reference under the Federal Circuit’s doctrine of
anticipation.219
Judge Rader explained that patent protection could still be available for
metabolites of pharmaceutical compounds so long as they were properly
claimed, and provided guidance for future drafters seeking such
protection.220 The metabolite could be claimed in its pure and isolated
form;221 or it might be claimed as a pharmaceutical composition (bonded to
an acceptable pharmaceutical carrier).222 In the alternative, the “drafter
could also claim a method of administering the metabolite or the
corresponding pharmaceutical composition.”223 Thus, according to Judge
Rader, proper claiming avoids the inherent anticipation doctrine
promulgated under Schering Corp.
3. Denial of En Banc Review
Did Judge Rader’s opinion in Schering Corp. violate the Federal
Circuit’s local rules by overruling a binding precedent via panel
decision?224 It appeared that way to Judges Newman and Lourie, who
dissented from the denial of en banc review.225

Because inherency places subject matter in the public domain as well as an express
disclosure, the inherent disclosure of the entire claimed subject matter anticipates
as well as inherent disclosure of a single feature of the claimed subject matter. The
extent of the inherent disclosure does not limit its anticipatory effect. In general, a
limitation or the entire invention is inherent and in the public domain if it is the
‘natural result flowing from’ the explicit disclosure of the prior art.
Id. (emphasis added).
216. Id. at 1380–81.
217. See id. at 1380.
218. Id. at 1381.
219. See id.
220. See id. (“With proper claiming, patent protection is available for metabolites of
known drugs.”).
221. See id.
222. See id.
223. Id.
224. See FED. CIR. R. 35(a)(1) (“Arguing to a Panel to Overrule a Precedent. Although
only the court en banc may overrule a binding precedent, a party may argue, in its brief and
oral argument, to overrule a binding precedent without petitioning for hearing en banc. The
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Judge Newman was concerned that, by finding anticipation of an entire
compound not known in the prior art and that did not previously exist, the
Schering Corp. decision departed from the “established law of
anticipation.”226 Judge Newman objected to what she viewed as “panel
disruption” of existing precedent, stating that if the law were to be changed
in this manner it required “en banc action.”227 Judge Newman argued that
the court’s precedent was entirely contradictory to the panel’s holding in
Schering Corp. that DCL was unpatentable simply because it existed, even
if no one knew that it existed.228 Most troubling for Judge Newman was
the fact that no prior art reference disclosed the claimed DCL, and that a
PHOSITA would not have known that DCL was formed upon ingestion of
loratadine by patients.229 Judge Newman was uncertain as to the
implications of the panel’s holding for the patenting of products that had
not yet been discovered, but desired that the court “speak with one voice on
this important question.”230
Judge Lourie also dissented, going so far as to call the court’s
“extraordinary decision” preclusive to “virtually all patents on human
metabolites of drugs.”231 This fact alone, in the eyes of Judge Lourie,
mandated en banc review of the Schering Corp. decision.232
Judge Lourie’s dissent also addressed the practical implications of the
Schering Corp. decision on the patentability of pharmaceutical compounds
and their metabolites.233 He was concerned that the Schering Corp.
decision would effectively preclude patent protection for these metabolites,
arguing that the court had essentially endorsed the holding that existing
patents may be effective prior art references to the metabolites they
generate.234 Judge Lourie did not question the notion that a pharmaceutical
product is unpatentable when it is “in actual public use” prior to the filing
of a patent application.235 Rather, he took issue with a decision “hold[ing]
that an enabling disclosure of ‘how to make’ metabolites is provided by the
mere recitation that one can administer a prior art compound to humans.”236
panel will decide whether to ask the regular active judges to consider hearing the case en
banc.”); see also Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 348 F.3d 992, 993 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(denying rehearing en banc).
225. See Schering Corp., 348 F.3d at 994–95 (Newman, J., dissenting); see also id. at 996
(Lourie, J., dissenting).
226. Id. at 993 (Newman, J., dissenting).
227. Id. at 995.
228. See id.
229. See id.
230. Id.
231. Id. (Lourie, J., dissenting).
232. See id.
233. See id. at 995–96.
234. See id.
235. Id. at 996.
236. Id. Judge Lourie noted, however, that he would have ruled differently if the ‘233
really taught how to make metabolites. “However, that patent simply included a minimal,
boilerplate statement of how to use the claimed products, sufficient to satisfy the
requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112, but far from the careful and thorough prescribing
information required by the FDA.” Id.
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Whether a pharmaceutical product patent owner would desire or require a
patent on a metabolite should not be the issue, Judge Lourie stated.237 The
holding “that a patent on a product, with a minimal disclosure of
administering it to a human or other subject, anticipates a later application
on a metabolite, of which no mention appears whatsoever in the patent,
cannot be correct.”238
The Federal Circuit’s subsequent decision in the SmithKline case,
however, indicates that the court has formally accepted the rule established
by Schering Corp., despite the panel’s detractors.239
4. Formal Acceptance of Schering Corp.: The Case of SmithKline
Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp.
SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp. endorsed the idea that
PHOSITA recognition of inherent properties was unnecessary to sustain a
finding of inherent anticipation.240 Judge Posner, sitting by designation,
authored the opinion dismissing SmithKline’s suit for patent
infringement.241 The patent at issue covered paroxetine (U.S. Patent No.
4,721,723 or the ‘723 patent), an antidepressant drug that SmithKline sold
under the brand name Paxil.242 Originally, paroxetine was patented by a
British company called Ferrosan (the ‘196 patent).243 Ferrosan was not a
manufacturer of pharmaceutical drugs, so it licensed the ‘196 materials, an
anhydrous form of paroxetine, to SmithKline.244 Anhydrous materials are
difficult to manufacture and maintain due to their tendency to become
“soggy” with moisture, thus requiring special measures to control
humidity.245 A pseudopolymorph of paroxetine, called a hemihydrate, was
subsequently discovered by SmithKline in 1985.246 The hemihydrate was
more stable and was more amenable to manufacturing than the original
anhydrous material.247 SmithKline patented paroxetine hydrochloride
hemihydrate, in which there is one water molecule for every two of the
other molecules constituting the unit crystal cell, as the ‘723 patent,
marketed as Paxil, in 1993.248

237. See id.
238. Id.
239. See SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 365 F.3d 1306, 1320–21 (Fed. Cir.
2004), vacated, 403 F.3d 1328, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc), aff’d on other grounds, 403
F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
240. See SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 247 F. Supp. 2d 1011, 1025–26
(N.D. Ill. 2003), vacated, 403 F.3d 1328, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc), aff’d on other
grounds, 403 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
241. See id. at 1052.
242. See id. at 1015.
243. See id. at 1015–16.
244. See id.
245. Id. at 1017.
246. Id. at 1016–17, 1022.
247. See id. at 1017.
248. See id.
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In 1998, six years after the expiration of the ‘196 patent, Apotex filed an
ANDA seeking FDA approval to manufacture anhydrous paroxetine
SmithKline commenced suit against Apotex for
hydrochloride.249
infringement, claiming that any version of the ‘196 materials would
necessarily contain the ‘723 materials, which was not set to expire until
2006.250 In the alternative, SmithKline argued that the likelihood of
producing the ‘723 hemihydrate was high even if Apotex was attempting to
produce the ‘196 anhydrate because of a phenomenon known as
Seeding would occur, SmithKline said, anytime the
“seeding.”251
anhydrate was improperly handled, producing the hemihydrate from the
anhydrate by way of conversion induced by “seeds,” which could be a
single tiny crystal or a grain of dust.252 The ‘723 material would then
multiply within the ‘196 material, “leveling off at a few percentage points”
of the whole.253 Finally, SmithKline argued that even if Apotex was able to
prevent the conversion of the ‘196 anhydrate into the ‘723 hemihydrate and
avoid seeding altogether,254 Apotex would still infringe the ‘723 patent
when patients ingested the ‘196 anhydrate and the human metabolism
converted it into the stable hemihydrate in the warm, fluid human
stomach.255
Judge Posner ultimately ruled the ‘723 patent valid but not infringed.256
Regarding the natural conversion of the ‘196 material to the ‘723 material,
Judge Posner construed the relevant claim “to cover crystalline paroxetine
hydrochloride hemihydrate in any commercially significant quantity, and so
construed[,] the claim [was] valid against the various attacks on it made by
Apotex but clearly [would] not be infringed by Apotex’s anhydrate
product.”257 If the claim was valid and infringed by a single crystal of
hemihydrate produced by Apotex, Judge Posner would allow Apotex a
complete affirmative defense that SmithKline was the cause of the
infringement.258 To allow any greater protection would be contrary to
established laws of patent and equity.259 Judge Posner was also
unconvinced that the ‘196 materials inherently contained the ‘723 materials,
stating, “I am not persuaded that Apotex will produce an anhydrate that has

249. See id. at 1023.
250. See id. at 1023–24.
251. Id. at 1020–21.
252. See id.
253. Id. at 1023.
254. See id. at 1020–21. One witness, testifying for SmithKline, proposed an interesting
scenario for Apotex if they wished to avoid “seeding” and infringement of the ‘723 patent:
Apotex could, theoretically, build a plant in Antarctica, where no hemihydrate had ever been
manufactured. However, a “depressed worker” could still possibly drop Paxil on the floor,
thus providing a “seed” and making it impossible for them to produce pure anhydrate and
thus, avoid infringement. See id.
255. See id. at 1014.
256. See id. at 1052.
257. Id.
258. See id.
259. See id. at 1046.
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sufficient hemihydrate to be detectable by the methods in use in 1985.”260
Thus, the ‘723 patent was valid and immune from an inherent anticipation
attack.
The case went to the Federal Circuit on appeal, where Judge Rader
dispensed of Judge Posner’s conclusions, holding the patent invalid for
being in public use in violation of 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).261 Initially, Judge
Rader’s panel did not use the inherent anticipation doctrine to invalidate the
patent. Instead, the panel reasoned that it ran afoul of the public use bar
because the drug was administered to patients without any apparent
confidentiality restrictions on the patients or the administering physicians
during the clinical trials.262 Addressing “miscellaneous issues,” Judge
Rader opined that if SmithKline proved that Apotex committed contributory
infringement by showing that the anhydrate necessarily converts to the
hemihydrate upon ingestion, SmithKline would have also clearly shown
that the ‘723 patent was invalid for inherent anticipation in light of the ‘196
patent.263 This point is dictum, however, because the appeal by SmithKline
for contributory infringement was moot as it ran afoul of the prior use
bar.264
Pursuant to an order en banc, Judge Rader’s panel again considered the
SmithKline case on remand, affirming the previous panel’s decision
invalidating the ‘723 patent, this time via the doctrine of inherent
anticipation.265 Judge Rader explained that the ‘196 patent suffices as an
anticipatory reference if it discloses in an enabling manner the production
of the hemihydrate.266 Because the ‘196 patent, when practiced, enabled a
PHOSITA to naturally produce the hemihydrate claimed by the ‘723 patent,
the ‘723 patent was invalid for anticipation.267 Judge Rader explicitly
stated that a finding of inherent anticipation “does not require a person of
ordinary skill in the art to recognize the inherent disclosure in the prior art
at the time the prior art is created.”268 The record contained clear and
convincing evidence that production of paroxetine anhydrate as per the ‘196
patent inherently results in at least trace amounts of the hemihydrate, and
the “court’s law does not require Apotex to take extraordinary measures to
practice the prior art without infringing [the ‘723 patent].”269 Judge Rader
did note, however, that SmithKline could obtain a patent for an inherently

260. Id. at 1036.
261. See SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 365 F.3d 1306, 1320–21 (Fed. Cir.
2004), vacated, 403 F.3d 1328, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc), aff’d on other grounds, 403
F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
262. See id. at 1317.
263. Id. at 1320.
264. See id.
265. See SmithKline, 403 F.3d at 1334.
266. See id. at 1344.
267. See id.
268. Id. at 1343 (citing Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 339 F.3d 1373, 1377
(Fed. Cir. 2003)).
269. Id. at 1345. One such extraordinary measure would be the requirement that Apotex
build a plant not “seeded” with the hemihydrates.
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anticipated compound using the proper claims, and that the holding merely
prevented SmithKline from obtaining patent protection for the “bare
compound” claimed in the ‘723 patent.270
Judge Newman dissented from the denial of a rehearing en banc,
expressly stating her concern that the court “has preserved the opinion’s
enlargement of the ground of invalidity called ‘inherent anticipation.’”271
Noting that the hemihydrate was first discovered in 1985 and may have
existed in 1984, Judge Newman wondered, “how then can it have been
‘inherently disclosed,’ in a patent application filed in 1975?”272 Comparing
the court’s decision to precedent, Judge Newman pointed out that there was
“no evidence whatsoever that the hemihydrate existed at the time the
anhydrate patent application was filed, and no evidence that such existence
would have been recognized [by a PHOSITA].”273 Judge Newman
endorsed the view that the inherent anticipation doctrine should be limited
to “situations where the common knowledge of technologists is not
recorded in the reference; that is, where technological facts are known to
those in the field of the invention.”274 To Judge Newman, inherent
anticipation required that a PHOSITA knew, or should have known, of the
presence of the inherent characteristics, “not that it might have lain hidden
in minuscule amount, undetected, unsuspected, and unknown.”275 In Judge
Newman’s opinion, the expansion of the doctrine of inherent anticipation to
a product that may exist in trace amounts calls the patentability of
antibiotics, hormones, antibodies, and other products into question.276
According to Judge Newman, this results in uncertainty regarding existing
patents, and the loss of incentives to search for the beneficial components of
existing materials.277 If a product’s existence is not known to a PHOSITA,
Judge Newman argued, it cannot later be retrospectively “inherently
anticipated.”278
Although SmithKline was decided later, it was the Federal Circuit’s
decision in Schering Corp. that settled the debate about whether PHOSITA
recognition was required to sustain a finding of inherent anticipation. The
court held that inherent anticipation is not dependent on whether PHOSITA
recognizes or appreciates the missing properties of the invention.279 The
proper inquiry, rather, is whether the result was “accidental,” obtained

270. Id. at 1346.
271. SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 403 F.3d 1328, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(Newman, J., dissenting).
272. Id. at 1329 (citations omitted).
273. Id.
274. Id. at 1330 (quoting Cont’l Can Co. v. Monsanto Co., 948 F.2d 1264, 1269 (Fed. Cir.
1991)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
275. Id. (citing In re Oelrich, 666 F.2d 578, 581 (C.C.P.A. 1981); Hansgirg v. Kemmer,
102 F.2d 212, 214 (C.C.P.A. 1939)).
276. See id.
277. See id.
278. Id.
279. See Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 339 F.3d 1373, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
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“under unusual conditions,” or a “natural result flowing from the explicit
disclosure of the prior art.”280
D. Predictions for the Future of Metabolite Research
Until the Supreme Court provides further guidance, the controversial rule
promulgated under Schering Corp. remains the final word on PHOSITA
recognition in an inherent anticipation analysis. Will the Federal Circuit’s
expansion of the inherent anticipation doctrine stifle future metabolite
research? Commentators are as divided as the case law.
One commentator argues that the Federal Circuit’s decision in Schering
Corp. seems harsh on its face, but its future impact is limited because
subsequent cases have strictly applied the “necessary and inevitable
consequence” test.281 Another commentator argues that the Federal Circuit
has created “a substantial danger to innovation” through its expansion of the
inherent anticipation doctrine.282 By removing the recognition requirement,
the Federal Circuit has expanded the doctrine and has created “a dangerous
weapon against innovation,” even though its public policy goals may be
admirable.283 Other commentators posit that excessive application of the
inherent anticipation doctrine chills the stated policy goals of the patent
system, goals like encouraging investment, innovation, and full public
disclosure of new inventions.284 Yet another commentator believes that the
clarification of the inherent anticipation doctrine by Schering Corp. may
actually undermine the doctrine itself by creating a burden that litigants are
unable to overcome.285 Could this doctrine be overtly problematic to some
inventors, yet still be kept in check? At least one commentator believes so.
Inherent anticipation is particularly problematic as applied against chemical
compounds, but the effect is tempered by the court’s requirement that the
chemical compound at issue must form in readily detectable amounts upon
ingestion for the doctrine to be triggered.286

280. Id. at 1378–79.
281. See Chen, supra note 27, at 119–20 (citing Toro Co. v. Deere & Co., 355 F.3d 1313,
1320 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Glaxo Grp. Ltd. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., No. 02-219, 2004 WL
1875017, at *19 (D. Del. Aug. 20, 2004); AstraZeneca AB v. Mut. Pharm. Co., 278 F. Supp.
2d 491, 515 (E.D. Pa. 2003), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 384 F.3d 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2004)).
282. De La Rosa, supra note 27, at 89 (arguing that pharmaceutical companies will likely
be dissuaded from investing in the research and development of metabolites as a result of
Schering Corp., because they will not be able to patent their discoveries and recoup their
investment, ultimately resulting in recourse to trade secrets).
283. Peter D. Smith, Anticipating Too Much: Why the Court Should Avoid Expanding the
Doctrine of Inherent Anticipation, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 823, 864 (2006) (arguing
that preventing drug companies from extending their patents beyond the limited monopoly
granted by Congress is admirable, but alternative means to accomplish this goal exist).
284. See Mueller & Chisum, supra note 3, at 1105.
285. See Alloway, supra note 60, at 93 (arguing that the limited understanding of many
biotechnology inventions may render impossible an accurate determination of whether an
inherent characteristic or result is necessary and inevitable at the time that such a
determination must be made).
286. See A. Meaghin Burke, Comment, New Approaches to Pharmaceutical Patent Law:
Why Current Patent Jurisprudence Is Inappropriate As Applied to the Unique
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Indeed, the predictions about the effects of the inherent anticipation
doctrine on metabolite research are wide ranging, due largely in part to the
rule promulgated under Schering Corp. and its progeny that a PHOSITA
need not recognize the inherent feature. Whether or not the doctrine will
actually stifle pharmaceutical research into metabolites remains to be seen.
This uncertainty has not, however, quelled the calls for a reformation of the
doctrine by commentators and patent practitioners alike, especially as it is
applied against the unpredictable biological, chemical, and pharmaceutical
arts.
III. TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCEMENT IN THE TIME OF SCHERING CORP.:
REEXAMINING THE DOCTRINE IN LIGHT OF OUR RAPIDLY EXPANDING
BASE OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE
The utterly confusing nature of the inherent anticipation doctrine has not
only prompted calls for its reform, but also its outright abolishment.287 Part
III.A will examine several proposed changes to the doctrine of inherent
anticipation to make it less difficult to apply in future cases. Part III.B will
propose a new “capability” standard for courts grappling with issues of
inherency in patent law. This standard would focus primarily on what a
PHOSITA was capable of discovering, and would require a factual
determination as to the nature of scientific technology at the date of the
potentially anticipating reference.
A. Proposed Changes to the Doctrine
One commentator has proposed that the doctrine should be applied
strictly and narrowly in future cases to avoid the potential chilling effects
on innovation.288 This is not a proposed solution to the doctrine itself but
only to its application in biological and chemical patent cases. If the
inherency analysis is strictly applied in biological and chemical cases where
an absolute certainty of result exists, the chilling effects of the inherent
anticipation doctrine should be limited.289 Under this proposal, the doctrine
“would only invalidate claims that merely recite scientific explanations of
Another commentator proposes a
preexisting subject matters.”290
seemingly opposite solution: inventions directed at the biological and
chemical arts pose their own special problems291—namely,

Characteristics of Chemical Compounds, 75 MISS. L.J. 1143, 1163 (2006) (citing Schering
Corp. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 339 F.3d 1373, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2003)).
287. See Mueller & Chisum, supra note 3, at 1107, 1163–64 (proposing cabining the
doctrine altogether in favor of more robust tools for policing patent validity, such as the
nonobviousness requirement).
288. See Chen, supra note 27, at 119–21.
289. See id.
290. Id. at 121.
291. See Alloway, supra note 60, at 93 (“Given the limited understanding of many
biotechnology inventions, it may not be possible for the courts to accurately determine
whether an inherent characteristic or result is necessary and inevitable at the time that such a
determination must be made. Scientific understanding of the mechanisms of biological
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unpredictability—which is precisely why the inherent anticipation doctrine
needs to be relaxed, not tightened, when applied against such inventions.292
The very nature of biological and chemical patents should make courts
pause when considering whether “poorly-understood biotechnological
inventions” are inherently anticipated.293
Other commentators have suggested that inherency is best understood
from a public benefit perspective.294 The doctrine does not require
substantial change; a proper inherency analysis simply seeks to determine
whether or not the public already benefits from the invention.295 The
authors argue that this “public benefit” analysis makes sense from a public
policy perspective.296 If a court determines that the public already benefits
from an invention, the discovery of that benefit (or the causes for it) does
not justify withdrawing it from the public domain by granting it patent
protection.297 Conversely, if the public does not yet benefit from the
discovery, then a “discovery or modification that gives the world a new
benefit is precisely the sort of improvement that we want to encourage
through patent protection.”298
Substantive changes to the doctrine via the patent statute have also been
proposed. In patent cases where the inherent anticipation doctrine is
applied, some commentators argue that prior art relied upon to establish that
an invention is inherently anticipated should satisfy a heightened
enablement standard.299 Patent law already requires that an anticipating
reference enable a PHOSITA to make and use the invention described.300
The Federal Circuit explained that the patent statute requires an individual
to be able to replicate an invention without “undue experimentation.”301 In
action underlying an invention, which may be required to determine the necessity and
inevitability of the inherent characteristic or result, may only occur years later.”).
292. See id. at 77 (“[G]iven the particular problems associated with biotechnology
inventions, and other inventions for which technological understanding is limited . . . courts
should apply less stringent requirements for holding patent claims to such inventions
inherently anticipated.”).
293. Id. at 77 n.33.
294. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 2, at 374 (“[T]he inherency cases are all ultimately
about whether the public already gets the benefit of the claimed element or invention.”).
295. See id. (“If the public already benefits from the invention, even if they don’t know
why, the invention is inherent in the prior art. If the public doesn’t benefit from the
invention, there is no inherency.”).
296. See id. at 407.
297. See id. (arguing that such a discovery “adds only a modest amount to our
technological capabilities and does not justify withdrawing from the public the benefit they
already receive”).
298. Id.
299. See Mueller & Chisum, supra note 3, at 1108.
300. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006) (“The specification shall contain a written description of
the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear,
concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or
with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same . . . .”); see also supra Part
I and accompanying text.
301. See In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 736–37 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“[E]xperimentation needed
to practice the invention must not be undue experimentation.”). In determining whether
experimentation is “undue,” the court weighs the following factors: (1) the quantity of

198

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82

cases where the doctrine of inherent anticipation is invoked to defeat
patentability, however, “the level of enablement provided by the prior art
through examples, instructions, or other guidance must be such that if
followed, the prior artisan would inevitably achieve the claimed invention
with at most de minimis experimentation.”302 The authors argue that the
inherent anticipation doctrine should be used sparingly to defeat
patentability, and posit that, under a heightened enablement theory,
Schering Corp. might have been decided differently.303
The need to balance the public’s desire for low-cost generic drugs with
the need to incentivize pharmaceutical research into useful compounds has
prompted calls for other kinds of reform. At least one commentator has
called for changes to the patent statute itself, allowing for a short patent
term extension to an existing patent to protect newly discovered metabolites
provided that the science is “sufficiently advanced.”304 This change,
however, should be limited in scope to allow an individual to avoid liability
for infringement if he unknowingly practices the metabolite or the prior
art.305
B. Towards a New “Capability” Standard for Inherent
Anticipation Analyses in Patent Cases
Scientific advancement is proceeding rapidly. Consider the following
examples. The storage capacity of computing hardware doubles every
eighteen months but new biological data are doubling every nine months.306
Researchers recently developed the most powerful brain simulation ever—
the Sequoia supercomputer at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory—
with a simulated 10 billion neurons and 100 trillion connections among
them.307 When the Human Genome Project launched in 1990, the scientific
experimentation necessary; (2) the amount of direction or guidance presented; (3) the
presence or absence of working examples; (4) the nature of the invention; (5) the state of the
prior art; (6) the relative skill of those in the art; (7) the predictability or unpredictability of
the art; and (8) the breadth of the claims. Id. at 737.
302. Mueller & Chisum, supra note 3, at 1145–46 (arguing that experimentation should
be limited to trivial choices and not the conventional trial-and-error testing expected of those
who want to replicate a patented invention by following the patentee’s teachings).
303. See id. at 1153–54 (arguing that the ‘233 patent’s disclosure could not satisfy the
author’s proposed heightened enablement standard, leaving the court to “forc[e] the square
peg of Schering into the round hole of anticipation by inherency”).
304. De La Rosa, supra note 27, at 89–90 (arguing for a middle ground for patenting
metabolites wherein additional patent protection is appropriate so long as a PHOSITA did
not recognize the inherent feature and the discovery sufficiently advanced the public’s
scientific knowledge).
305. See id. at 90.
306. See Quick Facts and Figures About Biological Data, ELIXIR, http://www.elixireurope.org/news/quick-facts-and-figures-about-biological-data (last visited Sept. 20, 2013).
307. See Rebecca Boyle, Simulated Brain Ramps up To Include 100 Trillion Synapses,
POPULAR SCIENCE (Nov. 19, 2012, 4:02 PM), http://www.popsci.com/technology/
article/2012-11/world’s-fastest-supercomputer-simulates-100-trillion-synapses-manyhuman-brain (noting the “unprecedented 2.084 billion neurosynaptic cores, which are an
IBM-designed computer architecture that is designed to work like a [human] brain”
(emphasis added)).
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community was deeply skeptical about whether the project’s audacious
goals could be achieved. In April 2003, the International Human Genome
Sequencing Consortium announced the successful completion of the
project, mapping the genome to within 99.99% accuracy, more than two
years ahead of schedule.308 Moore’s Law, simply stated, holds that the
number of transistors that can be successfully placed on a processor will
double approximately every eighteen months. Although Moore’s Law held
true for many decades, some believed that the end of Moore’s Law was
near.309 But, in February 2012, researchers announced the successful
production of a single-atom transistor that would effectively allow
computer manufacturers to beat the physical limits of Moore’s law.310 At
least one commentator believes that the rate of technological growth is
exponential, rather than linear, and, at today’s rate, progress achieved in the
next 100 years will actually resemble 20,000 years of progress, attributable
mainly to synergistic feedback among the various fields of scientific
research, including genetics, nanotechnology, and robotics.311
Metabolomics (research concerned with the comprehensive characterization
of the small molecule metabolites in biological systems) currently benefits
from the “rapid pace” at which metabolite detection and elucidation
techniques are evolving, with data reporting in this area having increased
over 600 percent in recent years.312 As science uncovers more about the
world, all we know with certainty is that we do not know much.313

308. See International Consortium Completes Human Genome Project, NAT’L HUM.
GENOME RES. INST. (Apr. 14, 2003), http://www.genome.gov/11006929.
309. See Brooke Crothers, Report: IBM Researcher Says Moore’s Law at End, CNET
NEWS (Apr. 9, 2009, 9:00 PM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-13924_3-10216733-64.html.
310. See One and Done: Single-Atom Transistor Is End of Moore’s Law; May Be
Beginning of Quantum Computing, PURDUE U. NEWS SERVICE (Feb. 19, 2012),
http://www.purdue.edu/newsroom/research/2012/120219KlimeckAtom.html.
311. See Ray Kurzweil, The Law of Accelerating Returns, KURZWEIL ACCELERATING
INTELLIGENCE (Mar. 7, 2001), http://www.kurzweilai.net/the-law-of-accelerating-returns
(arguing that technological growth is exponential, not linear, and, at today’s rate, 100 years
of scientific advancement in the twenty-first century will actually resemble around 20,000
years of progress by century’s end).
312. See Thomas A. Baillie, Metabolism and Toxicity of Drugs. Two Decades of
Progress in Industrial Drug Metabolism, 21 CHEMICAL RES. TOXICOLOGY 129, 135 (2008);
see also David S. Wishart et al., HMDB 3.0—The Human Metabolome Database in 2013, 41
NUCLEIC ACIDS RES. 801 (2012) (“[T]he number of annotated metabolite entries has grown
from 6500 to more than 40,000 (a 600% increase). This enormous expansion is a result of
the inclusion of both ‘detected’ metabolites (those with measured concentrations or
experimental confirmation of their existence) and ‘expected’ metabolites (those for which
biochemical pathways are known or human intake/exposure is frequent but the compound
has yet to be detected in the body).” (emphasis added)).
313. See Adam Hadhazy, Science’s 8 Greatest Unsolved Mysteries: Progress Report,
POPULAR
MECHANICS,
http://www.popularmechanics.com/science/sciences-greatestunsolved-mysteries-progress-report#slide-1 (last visited Sept. 20, 2013).
We’ve split the atom and gone to the moon, spliced open the genome and saved
countless lives with medicines. Yet as far as we’ve come, we have a long way to
go. We continue to grapple with realties beyond our understanding, from the inner
workings of our bodies to the intrinsic mechanics of the universe.
Id.
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The point of the previous paragraphs is not to trumpet the advancement
of scientific progress, but merely to emphasize that the public’s analytical
knowledge of the world advances at a rapidly increasing rate. Metabolite
research in particular has progressed exponentially, yet it remains in its
infancy.314 In fact, the Metabolomics Society, whose goal is to promote the
growth, use, and understanding of metabolomics in the life sciences, was
only founded in 2004.315 Recent estimates hold that many chemical
metabolites are currently unknown, but likely “play vital and previously
unappreciated roles in human health and disease.”316 In fact, researchers
have already successfully identified metabolites associated with chronic
pain when found in higher than normal levels, a discovery that might lead
to new treatment options for chronic pain sufferers.317 The notion that
metabolism inactivates pharmaceutically active drugs seems antiquated in
the face of increasing evidence that metabolites are just as efficacious, if not
more so, than the parent drug they were derived from.318 In fact, their
increased safety profile has led to the use of metabolites as a source for new
drug candidates.319 Moreover, advanced technologies such as deeplearning artificial intelligence programs and supercomputers are providing
new means by which to identify promising new molecules for drug
design.320
Commentators who disagree about the scope or application of the
inherent anticipation doctrine seem to agree, however, on the usefulness and
beneficial aspects of metabolites.321 This Note agrees with previous
scholarship that labels the discovery of metabolites as a “substantial
discovery that advances science.”322 Unfortunately, pharmaceutical drug

314. See Cory Abate-Shen & Michael M. Shen, Diagnostics: The Prostate-Cancer
Metabolome, 457 NATURE 799, 799 (2009) (noting that until now cancer metabolomics has
remained in its infancy).
315. See
Society
History
and
Objectives,
METABOLOMICS
SOC’Y,
http://www.metabolomicssociety.org/history (last visited Sept. 20, 2013).
316. Expanding Database Enables Discoveries in Emerging Field of Metabolomics,
SCRIPPS
RES.
INST.
(Sept.
10,
2012),
http://www.scripps.edu/news/press/
2012/20120910suizdak.html (emphasis added).
317. See id. (stating that researchers are already identifying metabolites involved in
cancer progression, aging, and drug addiction, and that these and further discoveries are
likely to provide promising targets for new therapies).
318. See Jiunn H. Lin & Anthony Y. H. Lu, Role of Pharmacokinetics and Metabolism in
Drug Discovery and Development, 49 PHARMACOLOGICAL REV. 403, 407 (1997).
319. See id. (describing that acetaminophen demonstrates greater analgesic activity when
compared to its parent compound phenacetin, and does not cause methemoglobinemia (a
blood disorder that produces an abnormal amount of a form of hemoglobin) or hemolytic
anemia (a condition in which the body does not have enough healthy red blood cells)).
320. See John Markoff, Learning Curve: No Longer Just a Human Trait, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 24, 2012, at A1.
321. See Chen, supra note 27, at 112–13 (arguing that branded pharmaceutical companies
will continue metabolite research in spite of the inherent anticipation doctrine because it
remains possible under Schering Corp. to gain patent protection for useful metabolites); De
La Rosa, supra note 27, at 83 (“The Hatch-Waxman Act acknowledges that pharmaceuticals
play a special role in our society.”); Smith, supra note 283, at 856 (“[M]etabolites . . . help
explain the scientific process behind drugs.”).
322. De La Rosa, supra note 27, at 90.
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research and design is a costly proposition.323 The average cost of bringing
a new pharmaceutical entity to market is $500 million over a period of
approximately twelve to fifteen years,324 with much of that time spent
seeking FDA approval that the entity is safe for public use.325 Completely
recouping the costs of developing a new drug can take manufacturers as
Over recent years, branded
long as twelve to nineteen years.326
pharmaceutical companies have seen a marked increase in competition from
generic competitors, resulting in a shorter time frame where they may
recoup their investment.327 Patent protection—the time-limited monopoly
during which they may make the drug, and exclude others from making the
same—is the primary manner by which branded pharmaceutical companies
can protect their investments. The expansion of the inherent anticipation
doctrine under Schering Corp. is likely to dissuade pharmaceutical
companies from fully disclosing their discoveries to the public via patent
specifications,328 encouraging them instead to seek to protect their
discoveries as trade secrets. The Federal Circuit’s Judge Newman
expressed a similar concern, stating that, “no newly discovered product
found in an organism [could] be patented” under Schering Corp.329
From a public policy perspective, recourse to trade secrets would
hinder,330 rather than promote, the policy goal of full public disclosure that
underlies U.S. patent law.331

323. See PHARM. RESEARCH & MFRS. OF AM., WHY DO PRESCRIPTION DRUGS COST SO
MUCH? . . . AND OTHER QUESTIONS ABOUT YOUR MEDICINES 2–3 (2000), available at
http://web.whittier.edu/chemistry/newdrug/PhRMA.pdf.
324. See id. at 2 (noting that much of the time is spent obtaining the requisite approval
that the drug is safe).
325. See Jaclyn L. Miller, Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act: The
Elimination of Competition Between Drug Manufacturers, 5 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 91,
96–98 (2001) (noting that patents are typically obtained before manufacturers go through the
approval process, and this FDA regulation causes time—approximately seven years—to be
lost on the patent).
326. See id. at 98.
327. See PHARM. RESEARCH & MFRS. OF AM., supra note 323, at 2.
328. See De La Rosa, supra note 27, at 87 (“[I]f discoveries such as [metabolites] are
denied patent protection, it is likely that companies like Schering will choose in the future to
maintain these unpatentable advancements as trade secrets, lest a competitor be handed a
starting point to reverse engineer a competing product before the expiration of the original
patent.”).
329. Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 348 F.3d 992, 994 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(Newman, J., dissenting).
330. See Unif. Trade Secrets Act § 1(4) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 538 (2005) (A “trade
secret” is defined as “information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program,
device, method, technique, or process, that . . . derives independent economic value, actual
or potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by
proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use,
and . . . is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its
secrecy”). The Prefatory Note to the Uniform Trade Secrets Act indicates why a company
would choose to maintain information as a trade secret as opposed to seeking patent
protection:
A valid patent provides a legal monopoly for seventeen years in exchange for
public disclosure of an invention. If, however, the courts ultimately decide that the
Patent Office improperly issued a patent, an invention will have been disclosed to
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Thus, in light of the importance of metabolite research to society, the
public policy goals of the patent laws, and our rapidly expanding base of
scientific knowledge, this Note suggests reforming the inherent anticipation
doctrine. The decision in Schering Corp. is notable for the establishment of
a bright-line rule,332 but this rule will ultimately fail to keep pace with
scientific advancement.333 The nature of scientific discovery necessitates a
new standard for inherent anticipation analyses, which this Note terms a
“capability” standard. This proposed standard is a two-part inquiry that
focuses on the state of the relevant art when the potentially anticipating
prior art was disclosed. Under this standard, a court dealing with inherency
should ask two questions: (1) Would the state of the relevant art at the time
of the anticipating prior art reference permit a PHOSITA to detect the
inherent feature? (2) If it would, would a PHOSITA have been reasonably
expected to detect it?
The first prong of this analysis asks the court to make a factual
determination about the state of the relevant art (e.g., biological, chemical,
or pharmaceutical) at the time that the anticipating prior art reference was
published.334 Such an inquiry would involve factual determinations about
the state of scientific computing and analysis, technological capabilities,
and scientific instrumentation during the relevant time period.
For instance, consider a hypothetical drug A, patented in 1980. Drug A
has a useful metabolite, metabolite B, discovered in 2012. Under this
Note’s suggested “capability” standard, evidence could be presented either
asserting or rebutting the notion that the technological capabilities of a
PHOSITA living in the year 1980 made it possible for him to detect the
inherent feature (metabolite B) which necessarily and inevitably follows
from the administration of drug A to patients. If metabolite B was

competitors with no corresponding benefit. In view of the substantial number of
patents that are invalidated by the courts, many businesses now elect to protect
commercially valuable information through reliance upon the state law of trade
secret protection. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974), which
establishes that neither the Patent Clause of the United States Constitution nor the
federal patent laws pre-empt state trade secret protection for patentable or
unpatentable information, may well have increased the extent of this reliance.
Id. prefatory n., 14 U.L.A. at 530. The patent term length has since expanded from
seventeen years to twenty years. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2006).
331. See De La Rosa, supra note 27 at 87–88 (“If Schering encourages recourse to trade
secrets, then the policy goals of patent law have not been served because scientific
advancement will not become readily accessible to the public.”).
332. See supra Part II.C.
333. A similar view has been expressed elsewhere in the scholarship on this topic. See
Burke, supra note 286, at 1163 (“The term ‘readily detectable,’ however, produces special
problems in the pharmaceutical context. As scientific equipment and methodology continue
to improve, the Federal Circuit will have to return to the ‘readily detectable’ standard and
clarify the requirement.”).
334. In cases involving drug metabolites, the anticipating prior art reference would likely
be the patent issued on the parent drug. See Mueller & Chisum, supra note 3, at 1148
(describing the argument of the generic drug company Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Inc., in
Schering Corp. that the patent on the parent drug loratadine rendered the patent on its
metabolites invalid as anticipated under a theory of inherency).
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completely undetectable in 1980, but new scientific instruments and
methodologies permitted its detection in 2012, the doctrine of inherent
anticipation should not be invoked to defeat the novelty of metabolite B.
If sufficient evidence demonstrates that a PHOSITA was capable of
detecting the inherent feature as of the date of the potentially anticipatory
prior art reference using 1980s technology, the second prong of this
analysis would ask the court to consider whether or not a PHOSITA
reasonably should have been expected to detect it. Perhaps metabolite B is
a pharmaceutically active metabolite responsible for the beneficial effects
of drug A, or perhaps it is the dominant metabolic product of the body’s
metabolism of drug A, or perhaps it is easily detectable in high
concentrations in the blood. In these cases, it is likely that a PHOSITA
would have discovered the metabolite during the course of obtaining FDA
approval, drug development, and other clinical studies. If both of these
prongs were satisfied, the patent on drug A would inherently anticipate
metabolite B.
But, perhaps metabolite B produces unforeseen side effects wholly
unrelated to drug A’s intended use. It is not uncommon for drugs to
produce side effects that researchers had no reason to expect.335 Under the
second prong of this Note’s proposed analysis, patent protection for
metabolite B should not be precluded via inherent anticipation, even if the
technology of the day permitted its detection. The complex nature of the
human body’s biological system produces strange, surprising, and often
unforeseeable results when it encounters foreign agents such as active
pharmaceutical entities.
Under the inherent anticipation doctrine promulgated by Schering Corp.
and reinforced by SmithKline, however, any undiscovered metabolites of
drug A, including metabolite B, would be inherently anticipated and thus
not patentable because they are a necessary and inevitable consequence of
the administration of drug A. Schering Corp. holds that it makes no
difference if a PHOSITA knew about the metabolite in 1980, or if he was
even capable of detecting its presence using the technology of the era. Due
to the costly nature of drug discovery and design, and the valuable nature of
metabolite research to society in general, it behooves the Federal Circuit to
reexamine the doctrine of inherent anticipation.
CONCLUSION
To date, the patent law doctrine of inherent anticipation remains mired in
confusion, both in its present interpretation and its future application. Much
of this uncertainty stems from confusing precedent and a recent

335. See Viagra Touted As Life-Saving Heart Treatment—After Scientists Find It Makes
Heart Muscles Less Stiff, DAILY MAIL (Dec. 23, 2011, 12:39 PM),
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-2078139/Viagra-touted-life-saving-hearttreatment--scientists-makes-heart-muscles-LESS-stiff.html (“The drug [Viagra] was first
developed as a heart disease treatment—it’s more well-known use was simply a lucky sideeffect.”).
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controversial decision in Schering Corp. that seemingly bucks that
precedent in favor of the rule that PHOSITA recognition of the inherent
feature is not required for inherent anticipation. Calls for doctrinal reform,
and even outright dispensation of the doctrine itself, abound. In the absence
of reform, however, inherency challenges against patent applicants seeking
to protect their technological inventions are only likely to grow as society’s
scientific knowledge increases. With its decision in Schering Corp., the
court has placed upon itself the daunting challenge of determining whether
or not a feature is inherent within the prior art. Such a determination is
typically problematic for the scientists and inventors behind these
discoveries, given the vast complexities associated with technological
inventions. It will be nearly impossible for the court to accurately assess
whether or not a feature is truly inherent in the prior art as our technological
capabilities quickly outpace the patent laws. The Federal Circuit should
reexamine, and strongly consider reforming, the doctrine of inherent
anticipation in light of these advancements. This Note suggests one
possible method of reform that focuses an inherent anticipation analysis on
the state of the relevant art at the time an asserted prior art reference was
published to determine whether or not a PHOSITA was even capable of
determining the presence of the inherent feature, and if he was, whether or
not he should have reasonably been expected to find it. By focusing its
analysis on facts that are readily ascertainable (such as the state of the
relevant art at the time the anticipating prior art reference was published), as
opposed to those facts which may only come to light years after a
technological invention is disclosed (such as an inherent feature which is a
necessary and inevitable consequence of practicing the prior art), the court
could alleviate much of the confusion plaguing the doctrine of inherent
anticipation.

